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THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE IMMUNITY OF STATES IN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

Karinne Coombes*
Introduction
On September 4, 1997, three suicide bombers killed five people and injured almost
two hundred others at the Ben Yahuda Street pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. Among the
injured were a Canadian, Sherri Wise, and three Americans, Diana Campuzano, Avi
Elishis, and Greg Salzman. The attack occurred on the last day of a volunteer
internship that Dr. Wise, a dentist, was completing at a dental clinic serving
underprivileged children.1 Hamas, which has since been recognized as a terrorist
organization by Canada2 and the United States,3 claimed responsibility for the attacks.
Six years later, on September 10, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia awarded Campuzano, Elishis, and Salzman tens of millions of dollars in
damages against Iran due to its material support for Hamas.4 Despite being successful
in their claim against Iran, the plaintiffs in Campuzano faced the prospect of not
receiving compensation because Iran had insufficient assets in the United States
against which the judgment could be enforced. Fourteen years after the Campuzano
plaintiffs “won” by securing a judgment against Iran, they moved a step closer to
obtaining damages from Iran when the Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously
upheld in Tracy (Litigation Guardian of) v Iranian Ministry of Information and

* Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
See “Hamas suicide bombing victim files first Canadian lawsuit against Iran under new anti-terrorism
laws” The National Post (29 September 2013), online: <nationalpost.com/news/canada/hamas-suicidebombing-victim-files-first-canadian-lawsuit-against-iran-under-new-anti-terrorism-laws>; Notice of Civil
Claim between Sherri Wise and the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian Ministry of Information and
Security dated September 27, 2013, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Vancouver Registry [Wise Civil
Claim].
1

See Public Safety Canada, “Currently Listed Entities” (15 February 2018), online:
<www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx> (accessed 20 March
2018).
2

See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”, online:
<www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> (Hamas has been recognized as a “Foreign Terrorist
Organization” by the United States since 8 October 1997).
3

4

Campuzano v Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F Supp (2d) 258 (DC 2003) [Campuzano] (The Court awarded
compensatory damages of over $18 million to Campuzano, $12 million to Elishis, and $10 million to
Salzman. Punitive damages of $300,000,000 were also awarded to the eight plaintiffs based on the principle
of awarding punitive damages of three times Iran’s annual expenditure on terrorism, which was recognized
as $100 million. Due to U.S. legislation prohibiting awarding punitive damages against states directly [but
permitting them against state agencies], the punitive damages were awarded against Iranian agencies named
as defendants).
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Security5 the finding of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 6 that the U.S. Campuzano
judgment (plus nine others7 in favour of over 100 U.S. plaintiffs) could be enforced
against Iranian assets in Canada. In March 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada
dismissed Iran’s application for leave to appeal, rendering the Court of Appeal’s
decision final.8
Tracy (Appeal) is noteworthy because it was the first case decided under
Canada’s Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.9 With the JVTA, Canada joined the
United States as the only states in the world that have implemented legislation
permitting domestic civil claims by victims of terrorism abroad against foreign states
that have been designated as sponsors of terrorism. While denying states immunity
from such claims has a firm moral foundation, it raises a number of issues that will be
explored in this paper. Among these issues is whether Tracy (Appeal) has resulted in
Canada violating Iran’s right to jurisdictional immunity under international law. As
the 2012 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Greece Intervening) suggests, there is a strong argument that
denying jurisdictional immunity to states in these circumstances violates current
customary international law.10 For the law to evolve to permit such claims, states will
need to recognize more consistently that they do not enjoy jurisdictional immunity in
these circumstances. Whether international law will evolve is questionable, as there
may be compelling reasons for states to resist this evolution, including their concern
that it may erode state sovereignty and risk negative consequences for international
relations. The experience of victims in the United States (and, potentially, Canada)
may also lead states to conclude that civil claims are not an effective means of
achieving justice for victims of terrorism.
The paper begins with an overview of international law and the principle of
state immunity, which is included to provide a necessary introduction for readers who
are unfamiliar with these topics. Part two assesses the practice of Canada and the
United States by examining the legislated exceptions to state immunity that allows
claims against foreign states that sponsor terrorism, as well as the decision in Tracy
(Appeal). Part three returns to international law and explores the decision of the ICJ in
Jurisdictional Immunities.11 This examination calls into question whether, through
5

Tracy (Litigation Guardian of) v Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, 2017 ONCA 549, 415 DLR
(4th) 314 [Tracy (Appeal)].
6

Tracy (Litigation Guardian of) v Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, 2016 ONSC 3759, [2016]
OJ No 3042 [Tracy (Sup Ct)].
7

See ibid at paras 6–35 (there were five separate motions brought in Ontario by Iran to set aside or stay
judgments in Canada that recognized and permitted the enforcement of twelve judgments of U.S. courts
against Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
as a result of eight terrorist attacks occurring between 1983 to 2002).
8

Tracy (Appeal), supra note 5 (leave to appeal to SCC refused 15 March 2018, without reasons).

9

Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, SC 2012, c 1 at s 2 [JVTA].

10

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), [2012] ICJ Rep 99
[Jurisdictional Immunities].
11

Ibid.
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Tracy (Appeal), Canada has violated Iran’s right to immunity under current customary
international law. Part four considers the potential for Canada to be a “custom breaker”
leading the way towards the recognition of a new exception to state immunity under
international law. Since an evolution in international law would require additional
states to embrace the legality of such claims, part five addresses the risks that may
result from allowing civil claims against states and part six canvasses alternative
means for achieving justice for victims of state-sponsored terrorism and other
international crimes.
The quest for justice for victims is unarguably laudable. Deterring heinous
violations of individual rights and achieving justice for victims ought to be goals
toward which the international community strives. As such, there is a strong moral
argument that it is appropriate and legitimate to hold states accountable for their
wrongs through civil claims in domestic courts and that it is incumbent upon all states
to support lifting immunity to allow for such claims. However, as this paper
demonstrates, since international law is created by states, it may not always result in
just outcomes; despite Canada’s laudable intentions, its legislation allowing for claims
against foreign states designated as sponsors of terrorism is likely inconsistent with
the current international law. Jurisdictional Immunities and the recent reaction of
states to U.S. practice suggest that international law does not presently support an
exception to state immunity for claims alleging violations of fundamental individual
rights committed outside of the forum state – including violations arising from statesponsored terrorism.
Since the scope of state immunity remains defined by customary international
law in accordance with state practice, whether the law will evolve to permit such
claims depends on states accepting a new exception to state immunity. Canadian
legislators should determine if Canada wants to help spur an evolution in international
law to allow for such claims. If Canada wants to be an effective leader on this issue,
it should encourage other states to accept that state sovereignty must yield to efforts to
ensure respect for individual rights and that international law should evolve so that
states are not entitled to jurisdictional immunity when they violate fundamental human
rights. An assessment of the potential risks that arise from allowing claims against
states suggests, however, that it is overly optimistic to conclude that an evolution in
the law will be forthcoming in the near future. Rather than align with what is
considered just and fair from a moral perspective, international law may reflect the
assessment by states of what rules best serve their interests. Although states may be
sympathetic to the plight of victims of state-sponsored terrorism (and other serious
violations of human rights), states may hesitate to recognize a new exception for a
number of reasons, including the risk that permitting such claims may erode state
sovereignty and pose undesirable consequences for international relations. Further
arguments may be raised against recognizing a new exception if the benefit of such
claims for victims is largely symbolic when lengthy, costly, and uncertain litigation
results in judgments that are unenforceable. This paper concludes that, while an
evolution in international law admitting a new exception may not occur in the near
future and civil claims against foreign states may be unlikely to achieve accountability,
the international community of states should still strive towards more fully respecting
and securing individual rights. It is incumbent on states to work towards achieving
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justice by pursuing alternatives to civil claims, including criminal prosecutions and
meaningful sanctions against individuals who violate the fundamental rights of
individuals and the states on behalf of which such individuals act or by which they are
supported.

I.

State Immunity from Enforcement Jurisdiction Under International
Law

State immunity is a complex issue on which manuscripts have been written. 12 Since a
fulsome examination of state immunity is beyond the scope of this paper, only a brief
overview of state immunity will be provided here. This part provides an introduction
to international law before turning to state immunity in order to assist with establishing
why Canada’s denial of state immunity pursuant to the JVTA13 may challenge current
international legal principles. Although there has been increasing recognition of the
rights of individuals at an international level, the limited potential for individual rights
to be secured through legal means is evident when efforts to achieve justice run counter
to long-standing principles of a state-centric international legal system.

(a)

International Law and Its Binding Obligations for States

Modern public international law has, historically, been state-centric, with states being
its predominant subjects and authors. States are the subjects of international law
because the law primarily gives rise to binding obligations for states and thereby
restricts what actions one state may take vis-à-vis another state and, in some cases,
individuals or groups of individuals. States are the authors of public international law
because they create international law. This “positivist”14 view of international law as
created by states is reflected in the primary sources of international law: conventions
(also commonly known as treaties) and customary international law. 15 Treaties are
12

See e.g. Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity, 3rd ed (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013) [Fox & Webb, The Law of State Immunity]; James Cooper-Hill, The Law of Sovereign Immunity
and Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Ernest K. Bankas, The State Immunity
Controversy in International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign States in Domestic Courts (Berlin:
Springer, 2005).
13

JVTA, supra note 9.

Modern conceptions of international law reflect a largely “positivist” theory of the formation of
international law as created by states for states, rather than a “naturalist” view according to which it is
understood that rules of international law exist and are waiting to be identified. For a more detailed
discussion, see e.g. Stephen C. Neff, “A Short History of International Law” in Malcolm D. Evans, ed,
International Law, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at ch 1; John H. Currie, Public
International Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at ch 1 [Currie, Public International Law].
14

15

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, being part of Charter of the United Nations and the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 [Statute of the ICJ] (generally
recognized as laying out the sources of international law: “[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; subject to the provisions of Article 59 [that decisions of the Court are only
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international agreements negotiated by states. The necessity of state consent to
international law is illustrated through how treaties operate: treaties are only binding
on states that have formally agreed to the treaty-based rules by signing and ratifying
the specific treaty and, even then, these rules are only binding with respect to the
mutual relations among states that are party to the treaty in question (and, even then,
only to the extent that the state has not made a reservation to certain aspects of the
treaty).16
At present, there is no treaty in effect that provides a binding source of rules
regarding the jurisdictional immunity of states. 17 As a result, these rules are found in
customary international law.18 Customary international law is formed when there is
sufficient uniformity of practice among states coupled with their opinio juris, which is
evidence that the state believes that the law obliges (or, perhaps, does not prohibit) the
act or omission of the state in question.19 Once formed, these rules may have sweeping
effect, as customary international law is generally20 binding on all states regardless of
whether a specific state has engaged in the practice underlying the rule.
Some rules of international law fall into the category of jus cogens.21 These
rules may be considered the pinnacle of international law, as they are so-called

binding “between the parties and in respect of that particular case”], (d) judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law”, art 38(1)).
16

For a discussion of treaties as sources of law, see generally Currie, Public International Law, supra note
14 at chs 4, 6.
17

United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, GA Res A/59/38,
Annex, UNGAOR, 59th Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/59/49 (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 2
December 2004, not yet in force) [U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States] (as discussed
more fully at note 61 and surrounding text, this treaty is not yet in force).
18

Statue of the ICJ, supra note 15 at art 38(1)(b).

19

See e.g. North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at
paras 74, 77 (where the Court suggested that state practice should be “virtually uniform” and explained that,
when determining the content of customary international law, “two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only
must the acts [of states] concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the
very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitua1 character of the acts is
not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which
are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience
or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty”).
Exceptions to customary international law being universally binding may exist for so-called “persistent
objectors” to the specific rule or if the rule has formed on a regional or local basis; see e.g., Currie, Public
International Law, supra note 14 at 199–201 (on persistent objectors), 201–205 (on “regional, special, or
local” rules of customary international law).
20

See Currie, Public International Law, supra note 14 at 98, n 52, 174–176 (“A jus cogens norm is a
‘peremptory’ or ‘non-derogable’ rule of international law that is so fundamental to the international legal
order that it cannot be set aside or suspended, even by the express consent of states”); John H. Currie, Craig
Forcese, Joanna Harrington and Valerie Oosterveld, International Law: Doctrine, Practice and Theory, 2d
21
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peremptory norms that are binding on all states and are rules from which states may
not derogate lawfully. Unlike general rules of customary international law that may be
displaced by a contrary treaty-based rule or through sufficiently consistent and
widespread contrary state practice, jus cogens may only be displaced by another
peremptory norm of international law. 22 Jus cogens rules of international law are
important for present purposes because state support of terrorism may lead to
violations of the state’s obligation to respect human rights, including the right to life.
The right to life, which prohibits states from arbitrary killing, is embodied in every
major human rights treaty23 and may be considered a peremptory norm upon which
the enjoyment of all other human rights depends. 24 The concept of jus cogens is also
relevant because advocates of permitting civil claims against states often argue that
states should not enjoy immunity when they are responsible for violating peremptory
norms of international law.
When identifying rules of international law, recourse may be had to
secondary sources, including decisions of international courts and the work of leading
international law scholars.25 Although the ICJ is often referred to informally as the
“World Court,” its decisions are only binding upon the states that are directly involved
ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at ch 2(E) [Currie et al, International Law]; but see Anthony D’Amato, “It’s
a bird, it’s a plane, it’s jus cogens” (1990) 6:1 Conn J of Intl L 1.
22

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 31(1) (entered into force
27 January 1980) at art 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character”).
23

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, UN Doc A/810
(1948) 71 at art 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171 at
art 6(1), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 at art 4; American
Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 143 at art 4; Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 at art 2.
See e.g. Kurt Herndl, “Forward” in B.G. Ramcharan, ed, The Right to Life in International Law (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) at xi (“Of all the norms of international law, the right to life must surely rank as the
most basic and fundamental, a primordial right which inspires and informs all other rights, from which the
latter obtain their raison d’etre and must take their lead. Protection against arbitrary deprivation of life must
be considered as an imperative norm of international law, which means not only that it is binding irrespective
of whether or not States have subscribed to international conventions containing guarantees of the right, but
also that the non-derogability of the right to life has a peremptory character at all times, circumstances and
situations”); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article
4), UN HRCOR, 72nd Sess, 1950th Mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 11 (2001) at para 11 (“The
proclamation of certain provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as being of a
non-derogable nature, in article 4, paragraph 2, is to be seen partly as a recognition of the peremptory nature
of some fundamental rights ensured in treaty form in the Covenant (e.g. articles 6 [the right to life] and 7
[the right to be free of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment)”); cited in Karinne
Coombes, “Balancing Necessity and Individual Rights in the Fight Against Transnational Terrorism:
‘Targeted Killings’ and International Law” (2009) 27:2 Windsor YB Access Just 285 at 298–299.
24

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 15 at art 38(1)(d) (the ICJ shall apply, “judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law”); it should be noted that “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” may also be considered by the ICJ per art 38(1)(c).
25
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in the case.26 While court decisions and academic commentary may be useful for
identifying the rules of international law that could apply to a future legal dispute, it
should be noted that a court or scholar’s interpretation of international law remains a
secondary source; underscoring the positivist view of international law, state practice
(with opinio juris) remains the means through which customary international law
develops.

(b)

International Law before Canadian Courts

Whether and to what extent international law will be considered and applied by
domestic courts depends upon the legal structure of the jurisdiction in question. 27 In
Canada, treaties are implemented through domestic legislation, which results in treatybased rules becoming incorporated into Canadian law. While it may be somewhat
unclear whether customary international law is directly applicable without formal
legislative steps to “transform” or incorporate customary international law into
domestic law, it is “probable” that customary international law is incorporated or
received directly into domestic law. 28 The principle of legislative supremacy in Canada
requires Canadian courts to give priority to domestic law when there is a conflict
between domestic and international law;29 as the Supreme Court of Canada has noted,
“Canada’s domestic legal order, as Parliament has framed it, prevails.”30
With respect to state immunity from claims before Canadian courts, the
Supreme Court has recognized that customary international law may be an interpretive
aid when there is a question of whether and how international law applies to a matter
before a Canadian court. In such instances, although there is a presumption that
Canadian law will be consistent with international law, “[i]nternational law cannot be
used to support an interpretation that is not permitted by the words of the [domestic]
26

Ibid, art 59.

27

For a more detailed discussion for how international law may be received domestically see e.g. Eileen
Denza, “The Relationship between International and National Law” in Malcom Evans, ed, International
Law (2nd ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 422–428; Currie et al, Interntaional Law, supra
note 21 at 539–541, 158-79; Currie, Public International Law, supra note 14 at ch 6.
Currie, Public International Law, ibid at 226–235 (after a review of case law stating that “[t]o summarize,
it can—still only cautiously—be concluded that, unless a statute or binding rule of precedent is expressly
and irreconcilably to the contrary effect, a rule of customary international law will probably be deemed,
ipso jure, to form part of the common law of Canada and to have direct domestic legal effect as such. As a
logical corollary, existing statute and common law that does not expressly override inconsistent rules of
customary international law will generally be interpreted by the courts in such a way as to conform to the
latter. In this way, it is probable that while preserving the domestic legal system’s ability, primarily through
the legislative branch, to control the content of domestic law through express override of a customary rule”
at 234, citations omitted).
28

Ibid at 234–235 (“the legislative branch may, if it so chooses, violate or override customary international
law. This flows from the basic constitutional principle of legislative supremacy which, although subject to
constitutional imperatives, is not subject to any requirement of compliance with international law, whether
of a customary or conventional nature”).
29

30

Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 SCR 176 [Kazemi Estate] at para 60,
citations omitted; see also R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292 at paras 53-54.
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statute.”31 In addition, “the presumption of conformity [of Canadian legislation with
international law] does not overthrow clear legislative intent… the presumption can
be rebutted by the clear words of the statute under consideration.” 32 Lacking evidence
that legislators intended to legislate contrary to international law, the Supreme Court
has noted that Canadian courts should take a cautious approach when assessing the
possible legal effect of state practice that runs counter to a previously established rule
of customary international law: “[p]articularly in cases of international law, it is
appropriate for Canadian courts only to follow the ‘bulk of the authority’ and not
change the law drastically based on an emerging idea that is in its conceptual
infancy.”33

(c)

Evolving Rules of Customary International Law

Identifying rules of customary international law may be difficult when state practice
runs counter to a rule that was previously considered well-settled. Since customary
international law is created through consistent state practice and opinio juris, when
state practice is in flux and states take different positions on the legality of a practice,34
uncertainty may arise with respect to the significance of the practice and its effect on
customary international law. Over time, customary international law may evolve in
response to changing state practice. While a detailed analysis of how customary
international law may evolve has been considered elsewhere, 35 the development and
evolution of customary international law is important for present purposes because
Canada, through Bill C-10,36 which introduced the JVTA37 and amended the State
Immunity Act,38 joined the United States and embarked upon state practice that may

31

Kazemi Estate, supra note 30 at para 60.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid at para 108, citing Jones v United Kingdom, Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06, ECHR 2014 at para 213.

34

It should be noted that contrary state practice, by itself, is not sufficient to undermine the rules of
customary international law; see e.g. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at para 186 (“The Court
does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that
instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of
that rule, not as indications of a new rule. If a State acts in a way that is prima facie incompatible with a
recognized rule, but defends it conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule
itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that
attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule”).
See e.g. Suzanne Katzenstein, “International Adjudication and Custom Breaking by Domestic Courts”
(2012) 62 Duke LJ 671.
35

36

Canada, Bill C-10, Safe Streets and Communities Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012, part 1 (as assented to 13
March 2012) [“Bill C-10”].
37

Ibid at s 2.

38

Ibid at ss 3-9.
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depart from the traditional understanding of the scope of jurisdictional immunity that
states enjoy under international law.

(d)

An Overview of State Jurisdictional Immunity

Under international law, states enjoy immunity from being subjected to the jurisdiction
of other states in many instances. While there are various aspects to jurisdiction (e.g.,
legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction39 and enforcement jurisdiction) and who enjoys
immunity (e.g., the immunity of the state as a legal person and the immunity of certain
state officials while in office40), the focus of this paper is on state (or sovereign)
immunity from enforcement jurisdiction. When a state is entitled to immunity from
enforcement jurisdiction under international law, this jurisdictional immunity presents
a legal bar to proceedings against the state. 41 Although jurisdictional immunity does
not excuse or render lawful the state’s violation of the law underpinning the claim
against it, it will deprive courts in the forum state jurisdiction under international law
to hear claims against the foreign state, including actions seeking to enforce
judgments.42

State Immunity and the Sovereign Equality of States
The principle of state immunity under customary international law has been longrecognized; however, its scope and effect has been subject to modification over time
as a result of changing state practice. State immunity is founded upon the principle of
state sovereignty and the limited exceptions that have been accepted over time may be
explained by the desire of states to preserve their sovereignty. 43
State sovereignty is a foundational principle of modern international law from
which the equality of each state flows. Its importance to the international community
of states is reflected in the fact that the “sovereign equality” of states is one of the

39

See e.g. Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015).
40

See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), [2002] ICJ Rep 3;
Chanaka Wickremasinghe, “Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of States and International Organizations” in
International Law, supra note 27 at 395–421.
See Currie, Public International Law, supra note 14 at 364 (“State immunity is a narrowly focused but
potent immunity in that it protects states from one another’s enforcement jurisdiction…. [S]tate immunity,
a long-established and universally recognized doctrine of customary international law, essentially blocks a
state’s courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign states”).
41

Ibid (“This immunity extends to all phases of the judicial process, including interlocutory or interim
preservation orders as well as post-trial execution measures and appeals”).
42

43

Reflecting the importance of sovereignty in this area, the discussion of jurisdiction and immunities in
International Law, supra note 27 at Part IV: “The Scope of Sovereignty”.
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principles upon which the United Nations is based.44 Sovereignty has historically
helped to shield domestic affairs of states from outside interference and has been
described by the unanimous U.N. General Assembly as meaning that “[all states] have
equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community,
notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature.”45
Affording states jurisdictional immunity helps to preserve their sovereignty
because when one state subjects another state to its jurisdiction, this risks undermining
the principle that they are sovereign equals; as John Currie explains, “[i]f all state are
equal in international law, so the theory goes, no state should be able to subject another
state to the process of its courts.”46 A further, “more informal and functional,” rationale
for state immunity is to assist with fostering friendly relations among states,47 (which,
by extension, may ultimately ease the way for peaceful settlement of disputes). The
U.N. Charter may, again, underscore the importance of these aims: maintaining
international peace and security is the first purpose of the United Nations, while the
second is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights.” 48 There are, of course, limits to state sovereignty that are
reflected through exceptions to state immunity. As the following section explores,
states have, over time, shown a willingness to redefine when they are entitled to
immunity under international law.

The Evolution of State Immunity from Absolute to Restrictive
Historically, there were no recognized exceptions to state immunity under
international law. Pursuant to this absolute approach, regardless of the nature of the
wrong being asserted, one state could never be subject to the jurisdiction of another
state’s courts unless the foreign state waived its entitlement to immunity because
“[a]ny subjection of a foreign state to domestic courts was seen as incompatible with
sovereign equality.”49 Over time, however, a “restrictive” approach to state immunity

44

See Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 15 at
art 2(1) (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”).
45

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UNGAOR, 25 Sess, UN Doc
A/Res/2625/XXV (1970) (the resolution goes on to provide for the elements of sovereign equality as: “(a)
States are judicially equal; (b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; (c) Each State has
the duty to respect the personality of other States; (d) The territorial integrity and political independence of
the State are inviolable; (e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems; (f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its
international obligations and to live in peace with other States”).
46

Currie, Public International Law, supra note 14 at 365–366.

47

Ibid at 366.

48

Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 15 at arts
1(1)–(2).
49

Currie et al, International Law, supra note 21 at 539–541; Kazemi Estate, supra note 30 at para 39.
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emerged as exceptions developed under customary international law as a result of state
practice (and corresponding opinio juris).50
One of the primary exceptions to state immunity that arose was based on the
nature or context of the alleged wrongdoing, according to which a state is entitled to
immunity with respect to its official acts (often referred to as “acta jure imperii”), but
not when its actions are akin to those of a private individual (known as “acta jure
gestionis”).51 Hazel Fox explains the rationale for this exception: with the “increased
participation of States in trading activities following the First World War, there was
much dissatisfaction with the denial of legal redress against States for their commercial
activities.”52 As a result, courts in Italy, Belgium, and Egypt “led the way in adopting
a restrictive doctrine construing international law as requiring immunity for
proceedings relating to acts committed in exercise of sovereign authority… and not
for trading activities or acts which a private person may perform.” 53
In l976, the United States became the first state to legislate a restrictive
approach to state immunity. 54 Since then, a number of states,55 including Canada,56
have adopted a restrictive approach by enacting legislation laying out a general
principle of state immunity, subject to specific, enumerated exceptions. In other states,
a restrictive approach has developed through domestic court decisions, while a
minority of states have retained an absolute approach to state immunity. 57 Although
state practice is not uniform, in many instances, the restrictive approach recognizes
exceptions reflecting a lack of immunity for private acts when a foreign state is
involved in a commercial relationship or for “territorial torts” when a foreign state is
responsible for a private wrong committed within the territory of the state in which the
claim is brought.58 Examples of claims relying on the territorial tort exception include
allegations that foreign states have violated employment agreements with embassy
staff or when a claimant seeks to hold a foreign state vicariously liabile for driving or
other offences committed by the state’s employees.
For a discussion of this evolution, see Hazel Fox, “International Law and the Restraints on the Exercise
of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States” in International Law, supra note 27 at 365–368 [Fox,
“Restraints”].
50

51

See e.g. Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 12 at 33–35.

Fox, “Restraints”, supra note 50 at 366-67; see also Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra
note 12 at 131–164.
52

53

Fox, “Restraints”, supra note 50.

See ibid at 367 (the approach had been signalled in 1952 with the U.S. State Department’s so-called “Tate
Letter”).
54

55

See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 10 at para 70 (the Court identified ten states that have legislation
regarding state immunity: Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia,
Singapore, Argentina, Israel, Japan, and Pakistan).
State Immunity Act, RSC 1985, c S-18 at s 3(1) (providing in s 3(1) that “[e]xcept as provided in this Act
[see ss 4-6.1], a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of any court in Canada”).
56

57

See e.g. Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 12 at 321.

58

See ibid.
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State Immunity Under Conventional International Law
Currently, there is no international treaty that codifies the rules of state immunity.
While the International Law Commission (“ILC”) worked on this issue between 1977
and 2004,59 the treaty arising from these efforts, the United Nations Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties,60 has not yet come into force.
Having achieved only 21 of 30 ratifications necessary for the Convention to enter into
force,61 it is questionable whether the treaty will enter into force. While the Convention
is not (yet) binding, it is worthwhile to explore its provisions briefly; it may be telling
that the Convention, which is the result of lengthy consideration of state immunity,
does not provide an exception that would clearly allow for claims against states that
have supported terrorist activities that harm individuals outside of the state in which
the claim is being brought.
The Convention, which only applies to civil claims, lays out a restrictive
approach to state immunity. 62 Part III of the Convention enumerates the “proceedings
in which state immunity cannot be invoked,” which are consistent with the exceptions
outlined above: commercial transactions;63 contracts of employment;64 territorial
torts;65 proceedings related to the ownership, possession, and use of property; 66
intellectual and industrial property claims; 67 proceedings related to the state’s
participation in companies or other “collective bodies;” 68 and proceedings related to
ships owned or operated by the state.69
While it would be imprudent to read too much into the existence of the
Convention that has only been ratified by a limited number of states, the Convention
may be considered evidence that state immunity is still generally interpreted
See International Law Commission, “Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission:
Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property”, online: <legal.un.org/ilc/guide/4_1.shtml> (detailing
the work of the ILC on the Convention).
59

60

U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States, supra note 17.

See United Nations Treaty Collection, “13. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States
and
Their
Property”,
online:
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&clang=_en>.
61

UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States, supra note 17 at art 5 (“[a] State enjoys immunity,
in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the
provisions of the present Convention”).
62

63

Ibid at art 10.

64

Ibid at art 11.

Ibid at art 12 (the Convention does not use the term “territorial tort” but applies to personal injuries and
damage to property that occurred “in whole or in part in the territory of that other State and if the author of
the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or omission,”).
65

66

Ibid at art 13.

67

Ibid at art 14.

68

Ibid at art 15.

69

Ibid at art 16.
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restrictively under current customary international law.70 Whether its exceptions
exhaustively reflect customary international law may be subject to debate;71 as Lori
Fisler Damrosch has maintained, a number of the exceptions contained within the
Convention could reflect customary international law,
but probably only… those that represented the lowest common denominator
of state practice at the time the Convention was negotiated, such as
acceptance that a state is not entitled to immunity for commercial
transactions as regards disputes falling within the forum’s jurisdiction under
applicable rules of private international law. 72

Reflecting on the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States, Fox and
Philippa Webb conclude that “a number of areas relating to the application of State
immunity… remain controversial or unsupported by general State practice.” 73 In their
view, these areas of controversy include when state immunity is denied for
“contravention of international law, particularly a violation of jus cogens” because
there is a “lack of acceptance among States” that violations of international law
provide “a basis for an exception to State immunity.” 74
What is clear, however, is that state immunity has evolved in response to state
practice. The next section will explore the practice of Canada and the United States,
as the only states that have legislated an exception to state immunity for states that
have sponsored terrorism. As will be discussed more fully below, arguments have
been made in favour of these exceptions on the basis that state immunity is outdated
and should not be available where states have violated the fundamental rights of
individuals.75 Despite the moral appeal of such arguments, as the majority of the ICJ
in Jurisdictional Immunities makes clear, it is unlikely that such an exception exists
See e.g. Christian Tomuschat, “The International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by National
Institutions” (2011) 44 Vand J Transnation’l L 1105 at 1118-19 (“The Convention has yet to enter into
force, but there is general agreement that as a reflection on the restrictive theory of state immunity its
provisions reflect current customary international law”); Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra
note 12 at 321 (“independently of the [U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States], the
overwhelming majority of States supports a restrictive doctrine. In the last decade it is increasingly rare to
find a case where a national court confronted with a claim related to a commercial transaction involving a
State trading entity has rejected jurisdiction on the basis of an absolute rule of State immunity”).
70

See e.g. Lori Fisler Damrosch, “Changing the International Law of Sovereign Immunity Through National
Decisions”, (2011) 44 Vand J Transnat’l L 1185 at 1190 (arguing that the “number[] [of states ratifying the
Convention] fall[s] far short of what is typically considered reliable evidence that a treaty reflects customary
international law binding on nonparties to the treaty”).
71

Ibid (“it is implausible that a treaty negotiated in full awareness that it was not congruent with existing
immunity law and practice of leading states [e.g., the United States] could be understood as establishing
new rules of customary international law at odds with the [U.S.] FSIA and judicial decisions in the United
States and other countries”).
72

73

Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 12 at 321.

74

Ibid.

See e.g. Francois Larocque, “Spleen at Ideal: les Immunites Jurisdictionnelles en Droit Canadien” (2016)
57 C de D 311; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 10, Cançado Trindade J, dissenting; Yusuf J,
dissenting; and Gaja J (ad hoc), dissenting.
75
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under customary international law at present. At best, customary international law may
be in a state of flux; while a new exception to state immunity may be emerging, it is
not yet clear that it will garner sufficient support among states to form a new rule of
customary international law.

II.

Terrorism Exceptions to State Immunity in Canada and the United
States

As noted above, Canada and the United States are the only states that have legislation
expressly denying jurisdictional immunity for civil claims against foreign states that
have supported terrorism outside of their respective territories. Because the United
States was the first state to introduce such an exception and lessons may be drawn
from its experience, this section will examine the U.S. legislation before turning to
Canadian legislation.

(a)

The Terrorism Exception in the U.S. Foreign State Immunities Act

The United States adopted a restrictive approach to foreign state immunity in 1976
through the Foreign State Immunity Act,76 which took out of the hands of its executive
branch the responsibility for determining when foreign states were entitled to
immunity before U.S. courts.77 The FSIA was designed to provide immunity for claims
related to official acts of foreign states while denying immunity with respect to private
or commercial acts.78
The FSIA has been amended on a number of occasions relevant for present
purposes, including in 1996, through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act.79 The AEDPA introduced a new exception (then section 1605(a)(7), but
renumbered in 2008 to section 1605(A) 80) to allow for civil claims against foreign
states81 with respect to injuries or death arising from specified acts that are often linked
to terrorism (namely, “torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [and] hostage
76

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, USC tit 28 s 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d) and 1602-1611 (1976) [FSIA].

See e.g. Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 12 at 238 (“A principal purpose of the
legislation was to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive to the judicial branch,
thereby minimizing the foreign policy implications and providing clearer legal standards and due process
procedures”); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations:
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back” (1998) 16 BJIL 71 at 72–73.
77

78

Fox and Webb at 238-39, citing Legislative History of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, House
Report No 94-1487, 94th Cong, 2d Sess.
79

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996)
[AEDPA].
80

Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 12 at 278.

Since 2008, the U.S. FSIA also specifically provides that claims may be brought against a foreign state’s
“agencies and instrumentalities”; see Rubin v Iran, No 16–5342 (1 February 2018) (slip opinion) at 6
[Rubin].
81
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taking”).82 An exception to state immunity also exists for injuries or death arising from
“the provision of material support or resources” for the foregoing acts, so long as the
“act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent
of [a] foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment or
agency.”83 As Naomi Roht-Arriaza explains, “[p]rovision of material support or
resources is defined broadly to include provision of currency or other financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, weapons, personnel and
the like.”84
The effect of section 1605(A) is significantly limited because it only permits
claims against states that have been formally designated by the U.S. Department of
State as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” 85 Additional limitations exist because “either
the claimant or the victim must have been a national of the U.S. when the act occurred”
and “the claimant must afford the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate
the claim.”86 As will be discussed more fully below, 87 these restrictions suggest that,
when drafting the AEDPA, the United States was mindful of, and was attempting to
limit, the potential for section 1605(A) claims to have negative consequences for its
international relations.

(b)

State Immunity from Enforcement of Judgments under the U.S. FSIA

As previously noted, jurisdictional immunity applies to all court processes, including
actions seeking to enforce judgments against a state’s assets. The U.S. FSIA reflects
this fact, as it specifically adopts a restrictive approach to the jurisdictional immunity
of foreign state property by recognizing immunity to attachment and enforcement, 88
subject to specific exceptions laid out in section 1610.
The primary exception for attachment and enforcement in the FSIA prior to
the AEDPA amendments was for commercial property held in the United States that
“is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim [being enforced] is
based.”89 The AEDPA expanded the amendments to allow specifically for the
execution of section 1605(A) judgments against “property in the United States… used
for a commercial activity in the United States.”90 While this amendment provided for
82

FSIA, supra note 76 at s 1605(A)(1)(a).

83

Ibid.

84

Roht-Arriaza, supra note 77 at 78.

85

See FSIA, supra note 76 at s 1605A.

86

Ibid at s 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 77 at 79, n 58.

87

See Part V(b).

88

See FSIA, supra note 76 at s 1602.

89

Ibid at s 1610.

90

Ibid at s 1610(a)(7) (foreign state property that is used for a commercial activity in the United States is
not immune from attachment and execution of s 1605A judgments against the foreign state).
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an expanded opportunity for the enforcement of section 1605(A) judgments because
it does not require the property to related to the underlying claim, 91 in September 2017,
the U.S. Supreme Court resolved in Rubin v Iran conflicting decisions of lower U.S.
courts and rejected the argument that the nature of the property at issue is not relevant
when determining whether section 1605(A) could be enforced. 92 As a result, section
1605(A) claims may only be enforced against a foreign state’s U.S.-based commercial
property.93 The limited ability for claimants to enforce section 1605(A) judgments is
relevant because it, again, may reflect the desire of U.S. legislators to ensure that the
negative effects of the terrorism exception to state immunity are limited and the
exception conforms to international law as much as possible even though, as discussed
below,94 it raises a substantial barrier to obtaining compensation for victims of statesponsored terrorism.

(c)

The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act Amendments to the U.S.
FSIA

The U.S. FSIA was further amended in 2016 through the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act to introduce broader exceptions to the immunity of states. The impetus
for the JASTA amendments were failed attempts by victims of alleged state-sponsored
terrorism to bring claims against foreign states that were not listed as sponsors of
terrorism. Such claims are exemplified by civil claims against Saudi Arabia for its
alleged support of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States that
were dismissed due to Saudi Arabia’s immunity.
The JASTA introduced a new provision to the FSIA, section 1605(B),
providing an additional exception to state immunity for civil claims seeking monetary
damages for “physical injury to person or property or death occurring in the United
91

Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 12 at 278.

92

Rubin, supra note 81 (the claimants in Rubin attempted to use s 1610(g) to enforce judgments against
non-commercial assets of Iran located in the United States. Introduced in 2008, this provision was intended
to codifying the ability for plaintiffs to attach and enforce section 1605(A) judgments to property owned by
an “agency” or “instrumentality” of a state that has been designated as a sponsor of terrorism.)
See FSIA, supra note 76 at s 1610(b)(3) (“any property in the United States of an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from attachment
in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State
after the effective date of this Act, if—
93

(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from
execution either explicitly or implicitly, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the agency or
instrumentality may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section
1605(a)(2), (3), or (5) or 1605(b) of this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or was involved in
the act upon which the claim is based, or
(3) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section
1605A of this chapter or section 1605(a)(7) of this chapter (as such section was in effect on January 27,
2008), regardless of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based”).
94

See discussion at Part V(b) of this article.
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States and caused by (1) an act of international terrorism… in the United States.” 95
Subsection 1605(B)(2) also purports to extend the territorial tort principle beyond the
United States, as it provides an exception to state immunity with respect to “a tortious
act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official, employee, or agent of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency,
regardless where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred.” 96
Notably, section 1605(B) does not limit claims to states that have been
designated as sponsors of terrorism, which significantly increases the potential for
victims of state-sponsored terrorism to bring claims against foreign states before U.S.
courts. Reflecting the controversial nature of the JASTA amendments due to concerns
regarding the effects on U.S. foreign relations, the U.S. Department of State and
President Obama, among others, opposed the new exceptions to state immunity. 97
Ultimately, the exceptions only came into effect after Congress overrode President
Obama’s veto of the JASTA.98
The JASTA amendments may widen the ability for victims to bring claims
against foreign states; however, unless further amendments to the FSIA are made, they
may offer only symbolic justice because the JASTA did not broaden the scope of the
exception for immunity to attachment and enforcement of foreign state property to
section 1605(B) claims.99 As the U.S. Supreme Court recently confirmed in Rubin,
95

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 114th Cong s 2040 (2016) at s 3 [JASTA].

Ibid at s 1605B(2); “international terrorism” for the purposes of this exception is defined in Title 18,
United States Code (“(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that—
96

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries
in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum”).
Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti, and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Congress Votes to Override Obama
Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill” New York Times (28 September 2016), online:
<www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-victimsbill.html> (“Mr. Obama angrily denounced [Congress overriding his veto to make the JASTA effective],
saying lawmakers had been swayed to cast a political vote for legislation that set a ‘dangerous precedent’
with implications they did not understand and never debated” and “[t]here were swift complications. Within
hours of their vote, nearly 30 senators signed a letter expressing some reservations about the potential
consequences of the law, including the prospect that the United States could face lawsuits in foreign courts
‘as a result of important military or intelligence activities’”).
97

98

Ibid.

See e.g. Ingrid Wuerth, “Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Initial Analysis” Lawfare (29
September 2016), online: <www.lawfareblog.com/justice-against-sponsors-terrorism-act-initial-analysis>.
99
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there must be an express exception under U.S. law for the attachment and execution
of judgments against assets of foreign states held in the United States. However, at
present, there is no legislated exception for section 1605(B) judgments. As a result,
while section 1605(B) enables victims to bring civil claims against states that have not
been designated as sponsors of terrorism, the property of such states is likely to be
immune from attachment and enforcement.100 Significant impediments to U.S. victims
receiving redress for their injuries resulting from state-sponsored terrorism will
therefore persist unless further amendments are made to the U.S. FSIA.

(d)

Canada’s Bill C-10 and the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act

In 1982, Canada adopted a restrictive approach to state immunity through the State
Immunity Act,101 which recognizes the immunity of states from the jurisdiction of
Canadian courts, subject to express exceptions. 102 As the Supreme Court of Canada
has concluded, for Canadian courts, “the SIA lists the exceptions to state immunity
exhaustively” and, where there are arguments that customary international law may
support lifting immunity in other instances, “Canada’s domestic legal order, as
Parliament has framed it, prevails.”103
Prior to 2012, the SIA provided for exceptions consistent with those generally
recognized under customary international law identified above, as the Act stated that
“a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of any court in Canada” 104 except
where: (i) a foreign state waives its immunity or submits to the Canadian court’s
jurisdiction;105 (ii) the claim relates to a foreign state’s commercial activities; 106 or (iii)
the proceedings relate to personal injuries or property damage within Canada (i.e., a
territorial tort).107

100

See ibid.

101

State Immunity Act, RSC 1985, c S-18 [SIA].

Ibid at ss 3(1)–(2) (“Except as provided by this Act, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of
any court in Canada”, s 3(1); In any proceedings before a court, the court shall give effect to the immunity
conferred on a foreign state by subsection (1) notwithstanding that the state has failed to take any step in the
proceedings”, s 3(2)).
102

103

Kazemi Estate, supra note 30 at para 60.

104

SIA, supra note 101 at ss 3(1)–(2).

105

Ibid at s 4.

106

Ibid at s 5.

107

Ibid at s 6.
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On March 13, 2012, Bill C-10108 came into force, which introduced the
Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act109 and amended the SIA.110 Designed to “deter
terrorism by establishing a cause of action that allows victims of terrorism to sue
perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters,” 111 Bill C-10 allows civil claims to be
brought against designated foreign states on account of their support of terrorism.
Parliament’s intention to provide for a new, limited exception to state immunity is
apparent through the JVTA’s preamble, which provides that “certain states that support
terrorism should not benefit from state immunity.” 112
Bill C-10 also introduced amended the SIA, introducing a new provision,
section 6.1, which allows for civil claims against states that have been listed as
sponsors of terrorism “on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs”
when the Minister “is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
foreign state supported or supports terrorism.” 113 Claims may be brought by “any
person that has suffered loss or damage in or outside of Canada on or after January 1,
1985”114 for acts within or outside of Canada that amount to “terrorism activity” under
Part II.1 of the Criminal Code.115 To bring a claim under section 6.1, the plaintiff must
108

Bill C-10 (Part I), Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, 1st Sess., 41th Parl., 2011. For a fulsome
discussion of a substantially similar bill that had previously been before Parliament, see Prasanna
Ranganathan, “Survivors of Torture, Victims of Law: Reforming State Immunity in Canada by Developing
Exceptions for Terrorism and Torture” (2008) 71 Saskatchewan Law Review 343.
109

Ibid.

110

SIA, supra note 101.

111

JVTA, supra note 9 at s 3.

112

Ibid at preamble.

113

See SIA, supra note 101 at s 6.1.

114

This date is largely seen as being selected in order to allow for claims by victims of the Air India
bombings, which occurred in June 1985.
115

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 (The Criminal Code adopts a two-pronged approach to defining
offences related to “terrorism activity” by enumerating offenses based on international statues in s
83.01(1)(a) and providing a general definition in s 83.01(1)(b) (the latter of which includes “an act or
omission, in or outside Canada, (i) that is committed (A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or
ideological purpose, objective or cause, and (B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the
public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling
a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act,
whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada, and (ii) that
intentionally (A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence, (B) endangers a
person’s life, (C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public, (D)
causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely
to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or (E) causes serious interference
with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as
a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm
referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), and includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act
or omission, or being an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to any such act or omission, but,
for greater certainty, does not include an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and
that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in accordance with customary international law or
conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities undertaken by military forces of a
state in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by other rules of
international law).
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be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, or the action must otherwise have a real
and substantial connection to Canada.116
Bill C-10 followed significant lobbying by victims of terrorism and torture
after Canadian courts repeatedly upheld Iran’s entitlement to immunity under the
SIA.117 The amendments also followed multiple attempts by Canadian
parliamentarians to amend the SIA to allow for these types of claims against foreign
states.118 Despite the desire of victims’ rights advocates that there would be a “full
and complete list,”119 to date, only Iran and Syria have been listed as sponsors of
terrorism.120 Potentially reflecting the difficulties that such a designation may have on
bilateral relations, on the same day that Canada designated Iran as a sponsor of
terrorism, Canada closed its embassy in, and severed diplomatic ties with, Iran. 121
Bill C-10’s amendments to the SIA also address the immunity of foreign state
property from enforcement action, allowing for attachment and execution of
judgments against the property of a foreign state listed as a sponsor of terrorism where
(i) the property “is used or is intended to be used by it to support terrorism or engage
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in terrorist activity;”122 or (ii) the enforcement action “relates to a judgment rendered…
against [a foreign state listed as a sponsor of terrorism] for its support of terrorism or
its terrorist activity and to property other than property that has cultural or historical
value.”123
The JVTA is ostensibly aimed at “impairing the functioning of terrorist
groups in order to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against Canada and
Canadians.”124 However, subsection 4(5) of the JVTA provides for the enforcement in
Canada of foreign judgments against states that have been listed by Canada as sponsors
of terrorism,125 without expressly limiting such enforcement to actions brought by
Canadian citizens or permanent residents, or to actions with a substantial connection
to Canada.126 Without such limitations, the JVTA opened the door for the execution
in Canada of foreign judgments in favour of foreign plaintiffs and provided the
mechanism for the U.S. plaintiffs in Tracy to enforce their U.S. judgments against
Iranian assets in Canada.

(e)

Tracy v Iran: A (Partial) Victory for U.S. Victims of Terrorism

The Superior Court of Justice’s Decision
Several claims have been filed under the JVTA;127 however, to date, only one, Tracy v
Iran,128 has been decided. In Tracy (Sup Ct), Justice Hainey of the Superior Court of
Justice for Ontario dismissed five motions brought by Iran to stay or set aside prior
decisions of the court that, relying on the Bill C-10’s legislative changes, had provided
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for the enforcement of twelve U.S. judgments awarding damages to over 100 U.S.
plaintiffs against Iran under the U.S. FSIA.129
Like many foreign states sued in domestic courts, Iran did not defend the
actions in Canada seeking enforcement of the U.S. judgments. 130 However, once the
U.S. judgments were ordered enforceable against Iran’s non-diplomatic assets in
Canada, Iran brought its motions to dismiss the Canadian judgments and advanced a
number of arguments challenging the jurisdiction of Canadian courts. These
arguments included that “the SIA is contrary to international law, including the
customary and treaty rules on state, diplomatic and consular immunity from process;”
“[t]he JVTA is contrary to international law, including the customary and treaty rules
on state, diplomatic and consular immunity from process, including enforcement;” and
“Iran is entitled to full immunity from civil and criminal process, including
enforcement, in accordance with international law and relevant Canadian
legislation.”131
Justice Hainey noted that the main issue before the court with respect to Iran’s
motions was “whether Iran is entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of Canadian
courts for its support of terrorism” 132 and ultimately dismissed all of Iran’s motions.
Without needing to explore in any detail the issue of what exceptions to state immunity
exist under customary international law, he concluded, among other things, that: (i)
Iran was not entitled to immunity under the SIA because it had been duly listed
pursuant to section 6.1 of the SIA as a sponsor of terrorism; and (ii) the plaintiffs were
entitled to have the U.S. judgments enforced because, among other things, the assets
against which the judgments were being enforced were eligible for enforcement
because they had not been designated as diplomatic by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs.133
Iran had further challenged the legality of the U.S. judgments under
international law on the basis that “the [U.S.] FSIA contravened international law and
the U.S. courts did not exercise a properly restrained jurisdiction.” 134 Justice Hainey
did not find it necessary to explore whether the U.S. FSIA was consistent with
international law. Relying on the JVTA and the amended SIA, he found that the U.S.
plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the U.S. judgments in Canada because the U.S.
courts had “assumed jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims on the same basis a
Canadian court would pursuant to a similar statutory scheme in Canada.” 135 Although
the JVTA only provides the ability to bring claims for persons who “suffered loss or
129
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damage in or outside of Canada on or after January 1, 1985,” Justice Hainey held that
U.S. judgments relating to terrorist attacks prior to January 1, 1985 could be enforced
because the plaintiffs’ losses had continued past January 1, 1985.136
The Court of Appeal for Ontario’s Decision
Iran appealed Justice Hainey’s decision on a number of grounds. Among other things,
it argued that “[t]he [U.S.] FSIA… contravenes public international law because it
creates an exception in U.S. domestic law to state immunity for a state supporter of
terrorism.”137 Canada intervened at the Court of Appeal; however, it did not take an
express position on whether its legislation or the U.S. FISA were consistent with
international law.138 The unanimous Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the
majority of the appeal, only allowing Iran’s appeal with respect to the U.S. judgments
relating to terrorist attacks that occurred before January 1, 1985.139
While Iran’s argument that lifting its immunity violated international law was
not persuasive due to the principle of legislative supremacy, international legal issues
were addressed somewhat more directly by the Court of Appeal.140 In his consideration
of whether the JVTA violated the principle against retroactivity, Justice Hourigan
briefly reviewed the law of state immunity in Canada, noting that “[s]ubsection 3(1)
of the SIA demonstrates Canada’s acceptance of the well-recognized principle of
customary international law that states are immune from the jurisdiction of other
states.”141 He also found that “[t]he rule in customary international law that sovereign
states enjoy absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of other states has evolved over
time resulting in some exceptions to this general rule recognized at common law” in
Canada and that the “statutory exceptions [in the SIA] are exhaustive… there are no
further exceptions at [Canadian] common law.” 142 In the Court’s view, Bill C-10
“simply added a new exception [to state immunity] for state support of terrorism.” 143
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Turning to the retroactivity of Bill C-10, Justice Hourigan found that
Parliament was “[aware] of its obligation under international law to respect state
sovereignty” and that its intent to introduce the new exception was “clear.” 144 Since
it was clear that Parliament intended to allow claims against states that are listed as
sponsors of terrorism, but it was unclear whether it intended to allow for recovery of
claims where the damage arose prior to, but continued past, January 1, 1985, the Court
of Appeal adopted the interpretation that would support “the presumption of
compliance with international law and the presumption against retroactivity” and held
that only claims relating to terrorist attacks occurring as of January 1, 1985 could be
subject to enforcement under the JVTA.145 In so doing, the Court of Appeal affirmed
the principle of legislative supremacy such that Canadian domestic law that
intentionally runs counter to customary international law will be enforced by Canadian
courts.

Justice Denied for Canadian Victims of Terrorism?
On March 15, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Iran’s request for leave
to appeal,146 rendering Tracy (Appeal) final. This decision may be hailed as achieving
long-awaited justice for some U.S. victims of terrorism sponsored by Iran. However,
it may also result in justice being denied for Canadian victims, including Dr. Wise, the
Canadian dentist injured in the terrorist attack described at the outset of this paper,
because Iran’s diplomatic assets are immune from enforcement and Tracy (Appeal)
will deplete Iran’s non-diplomatic assets in Canada. As a result, even if Canadian
victims like Dr. Wise succeed in claims against Iran, it is almost certain that they will
ultimately be unable to hold Iran financially liable.
In September 2013, Dr. Wise was the first Canadian to commence
proceedings under the JVTA, seeking an unspecified amount of damages from Iran. 147
She did not attempt to bring a claim against Iran prior to the passage of Bill C-10
because the U.S. FSIA did not allow non-residents to claim against foreign states in
the United States, and Canadian courts had repeatedly reaffirmed that an express
exception in the SIA would be necessary to lift state immunity. 148 Concerned that the
actions to enforce U.S. judgments against Iran would deplete Iranian assets from which
she could be compensated if she were successful in her action, Dr. Wise obtained
intervenor status in one of the enforcement proceedings decided in Tracy (Appeal).149
She was concerned that allowing the U.S. judgments to be enforced in Canada would
144
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result in the JVTA not providing a “meaningful remedy for Canadian victims of
terrorism sponsored by Iran”. 150
Tracy (Appeal) provided for the enforcement of judgments in favour of U.S.
plaintiffs with respect to approximately $1.6 billion against Iran; however, Iran was
estimated in 2013 to hold only an estimated $2.6 million of assets in Canada. 151 The
recovery of damages by the U.S. plaintiffs in Tracy (Appeal) and the corresponding
inability for Dr. Wise or other victims of terrorism sponsored by Iran to enforce a
future judgment against Iran means that Dr. Wise’s concerns have likely come to
fruition. It also highlights how legislation like Canada’s Bill C-10 may offer primarily
symbolic justice for victims of terrorism: even when victims are successful in bringing
a claim against a foreign state, they are often unable to enforce their judgments. The
potential for such legislation to offer only symbolic justice may call into question its
value in the eyes of states. At the same time, such legislation may lead to violations of
current customary international law, which will be explored in the following section
before turning to an assessment of the risks of recognizing new exceptions to state
immunity.

III.

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and Conflicting Norms of
International Law

The potential for state immunity to result in injustice for victims of wrongs committed
by states is clear. While arguments in favour of denying immunity are often rooted in
the nature of the wrong at issue and are compelling from a moral perspective, attempts
to limit further the scope of state immunity have met with limited success. 152
The concern that state immunity leads to injustice is reflected in criticism of
the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States for not including an
exception for serious violations of human rights. It should be recalled, however, that
the Convention was the product of lengthy negotiations and, in order to increase the
potential for states to become party to the Convention, it had to reflect the general view
of states regarding the law on state immunity. Fox and Webb have explained the
arguable “omission” from the Convention of an exception for human rights abuses by
stating that,
[t]his [omission] is not surprising when one remembers that the ILC
finalized its Draft Articles on the subject in 1991 and it is only in the last
two decades that the rights of victims and their families to recover
reparations for crimes under international law… have received recognition
in international law, and then mainly in ‘soft’ [i.e., non-binding] law.153
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Gerhard Hafner, who headed the Working Group on the Convention in 1999,
addressed this matter by explaining that there was insufficient agreement among states
to support including such an exception. 154 He also noted that such an exception would
be problematic:
Some criticism has been levelled at the Convention on the ground that it
does not remove immunity in cases involving claims for civil damages
against States for serious violations of human rights. This issue was raised
in the ILC and it was dropped. It was raised again in the UN General
Assembly and it was dropped because… it was concluded that there was no
clearly established pattern by States in this regard. It was recognised,
therefore, that any attempt to include such a provision would, almost
certainly jeopardise the conclusion of the Convention. In my view, there
are other arguments which militate against including such an exception. It
is said that we must limit impunity but suing a State for civil damages does
not address the issue of impunity. To remove immunity, we must prosecute
the individual person or persons responsible for the serious violations and
this can be undertaken in other fields but not in the context of this
Convention. Anyway, what is meant by ‘serious violations of human
rights’? What would be the scope of any such exception? .... There would
be significant problems of interpretation and this was also a reason why we
did not take up this issue.155

As Hafner makes clear, there may be difficulties with admitting a new exception to
state immunity, including problems with defining the scope of the exception.
Although Hafner was speaking in 1999, his remarks hold true today, as the tension
between individual rights and sovereignty has persisted.
Although customary international law is capable of evolving, it remains
questionable whether exceptions to state immunity for civil claims tied to the state’s
support of terrorism is consistent with current customary international law. While there
may be evidence that some states may be open to a future development in international
law according to which immunity is not enjoyed for serious violations of human rights
abroad,156 as the decision of the ICJ in Jurisdictional Immunities makes clear, there is
likely insufficient state practice to this effect at present. While this paper is primarily
focused on exceptions to state immunity for claims related to terrorist attacks, the
discussion of exceptions for human rights abuses is relevant because, as noted above,
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terrorism strikes at the heart of many human rights including the right to life, which
may be considered a peremptory norm of international law. 157
This section examines Jurisdictional Immunities, which supports the
conclusion that there are only limited exceptions to state immunity and that these
exceptions do not currently extend to allowing claims against states that sponsor acts
of terrorism outside of the forum state. Despite arguments that international law has
been moving towards additional exceptions to immunity,158 and the fact that the scope
of state immunity has evolved over time, the majority’s decision may support the
conclusion that international law is currently settled. As Fox and Webb maintain,
the ICJ… found conclusively that the plea of State immunity bars civil
proceedings brought against one State in the national courts of another State
for acts committed by State officials without any exception to such
immunity by reason of the gravity of violations of international
humanitarian law; or by reason of their jus cogens nature; or by reason of
the absence of any effective means of redress.159

Unless state practice evidences consistent state acceptance of a more restrictive
approach to state immunity that admits an exception for terrorism or other serious
violations of human rights, the reasoning of the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities
suggests that decisions like Tracy (Appeal) are likely inconsistent with current
international law.

(a)

Background to Jurisdictional Immunities

In 2008, Germany commenced proceedings at the ICJ alleging that Italy had violated
its right to immunity under international law. The dispute arose after a number of
decisions by Italian courts allowing civil claims to proceed and, in some instances,
ordering enforceable judgments against Germany on account of war crimes that the
German Reich had committed in Italy and Greece during the Second World War. In
one case, the Italian Court of Cassation ordered Germany to pay damages to an Italian
citizen, Luigi Ferrini, who had been deported to Germany where he was forced to work
in circumstances that amounted to slave labour.160 Following that decision, multiple
claims were brought against Germany before Italian courts. 161 In one case, the Court
of Appeal of Florence found enforceable in Italy a judgment from a domestic court in
157
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Immunities that the ICJ should proceed with caution due to inconsistent state practice regarding state
immunity: “[i]n light of this history [of the evolution towards an increasingly restrictive understanding of
state immunity], one can hope that the ICJ will not block national institutions from moving the international
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Greece that had found Germany liable to the survivors of a massacre of civilians in the
Greek village of Distomo during the Second World War.162
Before the ICJ, Germany did not dispute that it had committed the crimes
underlying the proceedings before the Italian courts 163 and noted that it “is fully aware
of [its] responsibility in this regard;”164 however, it nonetheless maintained that Italy
had “failed to respect the jurisdictional immunity which [Germany] enjoys under
international law by allowing the civil claims to be brought against it in Italian
courts”.165 Italy had not passed legislation providing an exception to state immunity
applicable in these circumstances, but it embraced the decisions of its courts and
advanced before the ICJ a number of arguments in favour of its position that Germany
was not entitled to immunity before its courts. Among other things, Italy argued that
international law did not accord jurisdictional immunity to states for serious violations
of the law of armed conflict. More relevant for present purposes, it also asserted that
Germany was not entitled to immunity due to the gravity of the German Reich’s
crimes, which it characterized as violations of peremptory norms of international law.

(b)

Jurisdictional Immunities and State Immunity under Customary
International Law

In a 12-to-3 decision,166 the majority of the ICJ held firm in Jurisdictional Immunities
to the view that states enjoy a wide scope of jurisdictional immunity under customary
international law. The majority did not find Italy’s arguments persuasive, including
that the nature of Germany’s crimes resulted in it not being entitled to jurisdictional
immunity.
While Germany and Italy both agreed that state immunity is derived from
customary international law, the Court took the opportunity to confirm this fact, stating
that:
the rule of State immunity occupies an important place in international law
and international relations. It derives from the principle of sovereign
equality of States, which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations makes clear, is one of the fundamental principles of the
international legal order…. Exceptions to the immunity of the State
represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality. Immunity
may represent a departure from the principle of territorial sovereignty and
the jurisdiction which flows from it.167
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The Court noted that some states distinguish between official and private acts of the
state and only recognize immunity for the former; however, the Court found that it did
not need to “address the question of how international law treats the issue of State
immunity in respect of acta jure gestionis [i.e., private acts]” because “[t]he acts of
the German armed forces and other State organs which were the subject of the
proceedings in the Italian courts clearly constituted acta jure imperii [i.e., sovereign
acts of state].”168 This finding could leave room for arguments in future cases that
states are not entitled to immunity with respect to violations of individual rights,
including violations that result from their supporting of terrorism, so long as one could
characterize these violations as a private act rather than an official act of the state.
However, this line of argument may be of limited utility in any future cases, as the
Court went on to conclude that illegality does “not alter the characterization… as acta
jure imperii.”169
Despite Italy agreeing that states are generally entitled to immunity in respect
of their official acts, it argued that Germany did not enjoy immunity in the
circumstances due to the territorial tort exception, 170 which it argued applied because
the claims in Italy arose as a result of wrongs that occurred in Italy (or related to the
enforcement in Italy of claims brought in Greece for wrongs occurring in Greece).
Italy also went beyond the territorial tort exception, arguing that “irrespective of where
the relevant acts took place, Germany was not entitled to immunity because those acts
involved the most serious violations of rules of international law of a peremptory
character for which no alternative means of redress was available.” 171
The majority did not find Italy’s arguments persuasive. With respect to the
territorial tort exception, it noted that “the notion that State immunity does not extend
to civil proceedings in respect of acts committed on the territory of the forum State
causing death, personal injury or damage to property originated in cases concerning
road traffic accidents and other ‘insurable risks’.” 172 It examined state practice, which
it found to be unsettled regarding whether the territorial tort exception applies to
official acts of a state, but found that it was not required to determine “whether there
is in customary international law a ‘tort exception’ to state immunity applicable to acta
jure imperii in general” because the situation before it concerned that activities of a
state’s armed forces “in the course of conducting an armed conflict.”173 After assessing
the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and state practice through
national legislation and domestic court decisions, the Court concluded that “customary
international law continues to require that a State be accorded immunity in national
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proceedings for torts allegedly committed on the territory of another State by its armed
forces and other organs of the State in the course of conducting an armed conflict.” 174
Notably for present purposes, the Court also did not accept Italy’s broader
argument that Germany was not entitled to immunity due to the heinous nature of its
wrongs. On this point, Italy advanced three specific arguments: (i) the acts
“amount[ed] to war crimes and crimes against humanity;” (ii) the acts violated
peremptory norms of international law; and (iii) “the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Italian courts was necessary as a matter of last resort” because “the claimants [had]
been denied all other forms of redress.”175 With respect to the first argument, the
majority noted that there was a “logical problem” if a state is not entitled to immunity
due to the gravity of the alleged crimes because “it would become necessary for the
national court to hold an enquiry into the merits in order to determine whether it had
jurisdiction,” which would thereby subject the state to the forum state’s jurisdiction. 176
It also considered that “mere allegation[s]” of serious wrongs would “be sufficient to
deprive the State of its entitlement to immunity” which would thus render state
immunity capable of “be[ing] negated simply by skillful construction of the claim.” 177
More importantly, the Court also examined state practice 178 and “conclude[d] that,
under customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of
immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international
human rights law or the law of armed conflict.” 179
The Court assessed separately Italy’s contention that Germany did not enjoy
immunity due to its violation of jus cogens and found that there is no true conflict
between state immunity and jus cogens. It reasoned that state immunity and jus cogens
are
two sets of rules [that] address different matters. The rules of State
immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining
whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect
of another State. They do not bear on the question whether or not the
conduct in respect of the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. 180

In the majority’s view, state immunity is a procedural matter and, although it may
result in a denial of redress for victims of wrongs committed by states, state immunity
does not permit or excuse derogations from jus cogens norms. As a result, since state
immunity does not permit the derogation from a jus cogens norm nor does it affect the
fact that the state has violated a jus cogens norm, there is no conflict between state
174
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immunity and the jus cogens norm. Similarly, the majority also concluded that a
victim’s right to redress does not rank as jus cogens; therefore, even when state
immunity denies a victim redress, this does not violate a jus cogens norm. In support
of its conclusions, the Court, again, assessed state practice and found that it did not
support Italy’s position, holding that “even on the assumption that the proceedings in
the Italian courts involved violations of jus cogens rules, the applicability of the
customary international law on State immunity was not affected.” 181
Finally, based on its review of state practice, the majority rejected Italy’s
argument that state immunity must yield to enable victims to have a remedy for
violations of jus cogens norms. While the majority was “not unaware” that upholding
Germany’s immunity “may preclude judicial redress for the Italian nationals
concerned,”182 it concluded that there was “no basis in the State practice… that
international law makes the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent upon the
existence of effective alternative means of securing redress.”183

(c)

Jurisdictional Immunities and the Divided Court

Although the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities took a firm view on the limited
nature of exceptions to the principle of state immunity, arguments could be made that
the reasoning did not foreclose additional exceptions, particularly where violations of
individual rights at issue were not committed by the state’s armed forces during an
armed conflict. In particular, the territorial tort and the private acts exceptions to state
immunity may provide an opening for finding that exceptions to state immunity in
accordance with Bill C-10 (and/or the U.S. FSIA) are consistent with current
international law because there is no compelling reason (except, potentially, state
practice) to limit a tort-based principle to the territory of the forum state or to find that
supporting terrorism is properly considered official act.
If a state may be subject to a foreign court’s jurisdiction with respect to claims
arising from the state’s wrongs in the territory of the forum state or in a commercial
context, is there truly a principled basis against extending exceptions to wrongs that
occur abroad or outside of a commercial context? Additionally, when a state violates
the fundamental rights of individuals, why should this be considered an “official” act
that attracts immunity? These types of questions found traction with a number of the
judges in Jurisdictional Immunities, including Judge Cançado Trindade. In a
comprehensive and resounding dissent, he characterized as a “juridical absurdity” that
the majority of the Court would
admit the removal of State immunity in the realm of trade relations, or in
respect of local personal tort (e.g., in traffic accidents), and at the same
time… insist on shielding States with immunity, in cases of international
181
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crimes—marked by grave violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law—in pursuance of State (criminal) policies.184

As Judge Yusuf, who also dissented in Jurisdictional Immunities, maintained, “State
immunity is… as full of holes as Swiss cheese.”185 He argued, therefore, that state
practice is sufficiently unsettled to admit new exceptions:
even the traditional distinction between jure gestionis and jure imperii,
which is often used for practical purposes to group together certain
exceptions, depending on the nature of the acts involved, is far from being
universally applied in a uniform manner, since the categorization of certain
acts under one class of acts or the other still remains a matter of controversy
among States and national courts. Moreover, the definition of the basic
concept underlying the distinction, namely commercial transactions,
remains elusive. In the meantime, the exceptions and derogations to which
State immunity is subject keep growing all the time.186

As Judge Yusuf reasoned, a “balance…. must be struck between two sets of functions
which are both valued by the international community.” 187 He concluded that Germany
should not enjoy immunity under customary international law for its crimes at issue:
“In today’s world, the use of State immunity to obstruct the right of access to justice
and the right to an effective remedy may be seen as a misuse of such immunity.” 188
Considering justice and fairness, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the
majority opinion in Jurisdictional Immunities is, to borrow the characterization of
Judge Cançado Trindade, absurd. Taking into account, however, the sources of
international law and how the majority of states have approached state immunity to
date, rather than considering this a “judicial absurdity,” it may be appropriate to
characterize as an absurdity of state practice that customary international law affords
states jurisdictional immunity with when they violate important human rights when
they do not enjoy such immunity in a commercial context or with respect to territorial
torts.
While the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities may leave a narrow opening
for finding that serious violations of human rights (including support for terrorism) is
a private act for which states do not enjoy immunity, when the decision is read as a
whole, it may be difficult to use the case to support this conclusion. Although the
majority avoided laying out its view on how a private act should be distinguished from
an official act of a state under customary international law, with the majority’s review
of state practice supporting its rejection of Italy’s argument that Germany did not enjoy
immunity due to the nature of the wrong at issue and its finding that illegality does not
184
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change an official act into a private act, it may be difficult to avoid the conclusion that,
unless and until state practice changes, the territorial tort and private act exceptions
ought to be narrowly interpreted.

(d)

Italy’s Response to Jurisdictional Immunities

States that are party to a case before the ICJ are obliged under the U.N. Charter to
comply with the decision of the Court. 189 It is therefore not surprising that, following
the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities, Italy “pledged to implement the judgment…
and ensure that its domestic courts would not hinder the implementation of the ICJ
judgment.”190 More notably, Italy also stated that it would ratify the U.N. Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States.191 Making good on this pledge, Italy enacted
Law No. 5/2013, through which it “ratif[ied] the [Convention] and provid[ed] for
[domestic] compliance with the ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment” by, among
other things, requiring judges in Italian courts then presiding over unresolved civil
claims against Germany with respect to violations of individual rights “to declare
Italy’s lack of jurisdiction.”192
Prior to the Law becoming effective, the Italian Supreme Court upheld
Germany’s immunity, which Filippo Fontanelli concluded “put an end to [the Court’s]
decade-long effort to find an exception to the well-known rule of customary
international law providing for State immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction for acts
iure imperii.”193 This conclusion, however, was premature. In October 2015, the
Italian Court of Cassation found that Iran could be subject to civil claims for its support
of terrorism on the basis that “the immunity of the foreign state is not a right but a
prerogative which cannot be assured when it concerns [state crimes]… perpetrated in
violation of international jus cogens norms, as such infringing universal values that
transcend the interests of the particular state communities.” 194 While this effort to
189
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enforce a U.S. judgment against Iran in Italy ultimately failed on other grounds,
Weatherall has argued that the reasoning of the Court of Cassation “is both
conceptually problematic and legally unsupported.”195 With this decision, the Court of
Cassation has flouted both Italy’s domestic law and, arguably, international law: “the
highest courts of Italy have now taken on both the ICJ… and the UN Charter.”196 In
Weatherall’s assessment,
[t]his is not a desirable state of affairs for international law however
laudable the motivations…. Although the Court of Cassation considered the
Italian judiciary to be contributing to the formation of a new principle of
customary international law that limits the jurisdictional immunity of the
state, the 2012 ICJ judgment makes crystallization of such a contrary norm
unlikely in the foreseeable future.197

A similar conclusion may be drawn when assessing Canada’s exception to state
immunity for states that sponsor terrorism. While Parliament’s intention for passing
Bill C-10 may be laudable, in light of Jurisdictional Immunities and state practice
underpinning the decision, it is likely that decisions such as Tracy (Appeal) result in
Canada violating its obligations under current customary international law.

(e)

The Potential for Future Guidance from the International Court of
Justice

Iran has asserted that Canada has violated its rights under international law through
decisions against it under the JVTA.198 Although it could use the reasoning in
Jurisdictional Immunities to support its position, it is likely that Iran will be unable to
challenge at the ICJ Canada’s denial of its immunity. This is because Iran, unlike
Canada, has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.199 As a result, the ICJ
will not have the jurisdiction to hear the case unless Canada consents to such
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proceedings.200 The ICJ may, nonetheless, consider the legality of the U.S. FISA
exceptions to state immunity in the coming years because, in June 2016, Iran filed an
application to institute proceedings against the United States at the ICJ. Iran is, among
other things, challenging billions of dollars that U.S. courts have awarded against it
under the U.S. FSIA on the basis that:
Iran and Iranian State-owned companies are entitled to immunity from the
jurisdiction of the US courts and in respect of enforcement proceedings in
the USA, and that such immunity must be respected by the USA (including
US courts), to the extent established as a matter of customary international
law and required by the [U.S.-Iran] Treaty of Amity.201

While it remains to be seen whether the ICJ will find that it has the jurisdiction to hear
the dispute,202 these proceedings may open the door to the Court’s future consideration
of the U.S. FSIA. If the case goes forward, the ICJ may confront more directly whether
state support for terrorism is an official or private act and whether the territorial
limitation to the territorial tort exception still reflects customary international law.
If it does hear Iran’s claim, the majority opinion in Jurisdictional Immunities
suggests that the Court will likely require additional evidence of state practice and
opinio juris to conclude that Iran is not entitled to immunity; if the seriousness of the
crimes to which Germany admitted were insufficient for Italian courts to be able to
subject Germany to the jurisdiction of its courts and remain in compliance with
international law, why would the position be different with respect to supporting acts
of terrorism?
It should be recalled, however, that the Court was appropriately careful in
Jurisdictional Immunities to frame its conclusions on the law as it stood in 2012, when
the case was decided.203 As the evolution of state immunity from absolute to restrictive
makes clear, customary international law is capable of evolving further through
changes to state practice. The question remains whether such an evolution has
occurred, if it is in the midst of occurring, or if state practice is closing the door on this
Statute of the ICJ, supra note 15 at art 36(2) (States ratifying the Statute “at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court”).
200
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evolution. The recent negative reaction from some states to the JASTA amendments to
the U.S. FISA, discussed below,204 may support the conclusion that such an evolution
has not yet occurred. Should Iran’s claim against the United States at the ICJ proceed,
this state practice will no doubt be assessed by the Court. The United States, however,
would be able to point to Canada’s legislation to support an argument that the U.S.
FISA’s terrorism exceptions to state immunity are consistent with current customary
international law. The following section explores Canada’s role as a “custom breaker”
and how Canada’s practices could support an evolution in the law of state immunity.

IV.

Denying State Immunity for Sponsors of Terrorism: Canada as a
“Custom-Breaker”?205

Although Canada is unlikely to face a claim by Iran before the ICJ, the fact that Canada
may violate current customary international law when its courts deny state immunity
pursuant to the JVTA and the amended SIA ought to be considered by the Canadian
government. As this section examines, it is not clear whether Canada was mindful of
customary international law when it enacted Bill C-10. By taking a clearer position on
whether, in its view, states are entitled to immunity under international law from civil
claims tied to their support of terrorism, Canada may more clearly act as a “custom
breaker”206 on this issue and thereby encourage the international community of states
to admit a new exception to state immunity under customary international law.

(a)

Tracy v Iran and Customary International Law

That the Court of Appeal in Tracy (Appeal) dismissed the majority of Iran’s appeal
should not be surprising in light of prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada 207
holding firm to the principle of legislative supremacy. According to this principle,
customary international law may be “displaced by [an] irreconcilably contrary
Canadian statute law or binding precedent.” 208 When Parliament expressly legislates
counter to international law, Canada may end up acting “illegally from an
international legal perspective, but would be doing nothing wrong from a domestic
[legal] perspective.”209 Following the reasoning of the majority in Jurisdictional
Immunities, this is precisely what has occurred in Tracy (Appeal): although Tracy
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(Appeal) was consistent with the JVTA and the SIA, it is likely that the decision resulted
in Canada violating Iran’s right to jurisdictional immunity under international law.
As noted above, in Tracy (Appeal), the Court of Appeal stated that Bill C-10
“simply” added a new exception to the principle of sovereign immunity. 210 While
Parliament clearly intended to deny listed states immunity from civil claims,
introducing a legal exception to state immunity is not simple under international law
because it requires sufficiently consistent state practice and opinio juris to this effect.
One may read between the lines of the majority opinion in Jurisdictional Immunities
to find that the majority may consider Canada, like the United States, to be out-of-step
with current state practice on this issue. In Jurisdictional Immunities, the majority
touched upon the U.S. FSIA amendments, noting, at the time the decision was rendered
(approximately five weeks before Canada’s Bill C-10 entered into force) that, “this
amendment has no counterpart in the legislation of other States” and that no state that
“has enacted legislation on the subject of State immunity has made provision for the
limitation of immunity on the grounds of the gravity of the acts alleged.” 211 Since the
United States was not a party to the case before it, the Court, appropriately, did not
assess the international legality of the terrorism exceptions in the U.S. FSIA. However,
in light of its ultimate conclusions on the broad scope of state immunity and its
identification of the United States an outlier on this matter, if the U.S. exceptions had
been before the Court, the majority may likely have considered the exceptions to be
inconsistent with current customary international law. This conclusion is supported
by the finding by Fox and Webb that “[c]ontravention of international law, particularly
a violation of jus cogens, has not yet been accepted [under customary international
law], as recently confirmed by the ICJ [in Jurisdictional Immunities], as a ground for
an exception to State immunity.”212

(b)

“Custom Breaking” Towards an Evolution in Customary International
Law

Without additional state practice supporting new exceptions, it is likely that customary
international law will reflect the status quo and afford only limited exceptions to state
immunity. While one could assume that Canada considered Bill C-10 to accord with
current customary international law when it was passed, a review of the legislative
history raises questions regarding whether Parliament was aware that Bill C-10 could
run counter to customary international law. If Canada wants to support an exception
to state support of terrorism (and, by extension, other serious violations of human
rights), it should adopt the role of custom breaker 213 to assist with moving this
exception forward.
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In Tracy (Appeal), the Court relied on the Parliamentary Information and
Research Service’s Legislative Summary of Bill C-10 to support its finding that
Parliament intended to legislate a new exception to state immunity. 214 While there is
no question that Parliament intended to introduce a new exception to state immunity,
the Legislative Summary does not address whether Parliament was aware that denying
state immunity pursuant to this new exception may be inconsistent with established
principles of customary international law. In particular, the Legislative Summary did
not consider how the majority’s reasoning in Jurisdictional Immunities could
undermine an argument that a terrorism exception to state immunity exists under
current international law. Although the Legislative Summary was revised after the
decision in Jurisdictional Immunities was released,215 it only notes that the ICJ was
“now preparing the judgment” after hearing Germany’s claim that Italy had “fail[ed]
to respect its immunity.” 216 The Legislative Summary may, however, acknowledge
implicitly that denying jurisdictional immunity for states that sponsor terrorism could
violate international law, as it notes that: (i) “exceptions to the general rule of complete
immunity have evolved over time”; (ii) “Parliament has acknowledged this evolution
by codifying the most common exceptions to the general rule of state immunity in the
State Immunity Act as it currently stands” and (iii) “Part 1 of Bill C-10 seeks to add a
new exception for state support of terrorism.” 217
The legislative debates regarding Bill C-10 also leave unclear whether
Parliament considered the terrorism exception to state immunity to be consistent with
international law. Shortly after Jurisdictional Immunities was decided, witnesses
before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs expressed
concerns regarding, among other things, the potential for Bill C-10’s amendments to
lead to violations of customary international law in light of Jurisdictional
Immunities.218 To consider this matter further, the Committee subsequently heard from
the Legal Bureau of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada’s Director of
Criminal Security and Diplomatic Law. The Director presented a narrow reading of
Jurisdictional Immunities, asserting that the Department had determined that Bill C10 was not “a match for that kind of situation” since ICJ decisions are only binding
upon the parties to the specific case and because “the current drafted Canadian
legislation” was not “similar in any way to the issue which was being discussed” in
Jurisdictional Immunities.219 There appears to have been no further substantive
214
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discussion on the legislative record regarding Bill C-10’s possible inconsistency with
international law and the matter did not appear in the Senate Committee’s report on
Bill C-10.220 In addition, although concerns were subsequently expressed by two
senators and one member of Parliament regarding the possibility that the legislation
could lead to Canada violating international law,221 no further public discussion of Bill
C-10’s potential inconsistency with international law appears to have occurred within
the Senate or the House of Commons.
If Parliament intended for Bill C-10 to provide a foundation for recognizing
a new exception to state immunity under customary international law, it may be
worthwhile for Canada to adopt a clearer position on whether, in its view, Bill C-10’s
amendments reflect customary international law. In so doing, Canada could assist with
providing clearer evidence of opinio juris to support a future evolution of customary
international law. By breaking from prior state practice on the scope of state immunity,
Canada could provide an opening for “forg[ing] new law by breaking existing law,
thereby leading the way for other nations to follow.” 222 As a witness urged before the
Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs during its
consideration of Bill C-10: “What is wrong with Canadian leadership? What is wrong
with Canada saying that is an important case? We are dealing with an important issue
here…. The victims are looking for their day in court. They are looking for tools to
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fight this because now they are alone. They feel helpless, and this bill gives them
something.”223
With Canada potentially breaking from current state practice on state
immunity, the reaction of states to this break may determine whether a future rule will
develop or whether Canada and the United States will remain outliers on this issue.
While a full examination of how customary international law evolves is beyond the
scope of this paper, it should be noted that customary international law on this issue
may be within a period of flux marked by inconsistent state practice; as Suzanne
Katzenstein explains, “[customary international law] cannot evolve without…
ambiguity and inconsistency in state practice.” 224 For the law to change, states must
determine whether they will endorse state practice that diverges from formerly settled
rules of customary international law. 225
If states respond favourably to the practice of Canada and the United States,
they may help to avoid what Roger O’Keefe has termed a “customary international
legal feedback loop” resulting from international adjudication.226 While, as noted
above, decisions of the ICJ are only binding upon the parties to the specific cases, such
a “feedback loop” may arise because, as secondary sources of international law, the
decisions often play a role in clarifying – and potentially solidifying – rules of
international law when the Court’s reasoning proves persuasive and is relied upon in
future cases before the ICJ, other international tribunals, and domestic courts. 227 In
light of this influence, Katzenstein argues that “early international adjudication”
adhering to a pre-existing rule of customary international law before states have had
time to react in support or against state practice running counter to the rule is
“problematic” because “it may discourage others from following the custom breaker
and prevent better [customary international law] from emerging… and, regardless of
whether states decide to follow the custom breaker, it cuts short the opportunity for
states to debate and respond to deviations from the status quo.”228 With respect to
Jurisdictional Immunities, Katzenstein concludes that, “[r]egardless of whether the
ICJ’s ruling is consistent with what states would have ultimately decided for
themselves, it is procedurally problematic for the ICJ to pre-empt the traditional
process by which [customary international law] evolves.” 229 It remains to be seen
whether the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities has pre-empted additional
restrictions on the scope of state immunity. Canada could, however, assist with
223
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avoiding a pre-emption by taking a clearer position on whether international law
supports an exception to state immunity when states sponsor acts of terrorism.
The ability for Canada’s legislation to spur an evolution in the law of state
immunity may, however, be limited. The recent reaction of states to the 2016 JASTA
amendments to the U.S. FISA may be telling and provide evidence that customary
international law is not evolving to recognize an exception to state immunity that
would allow domestic claims against states that sponsor terrorism or other serious
violations of human rights. Although states may have been willing to remain
ambivalent about the potential for the AEDPA amendments to the U.S. FSIA to violate
international law because it was unlikely that they would be subjected to claims due
to the listing requirement for section 1605(A) claims, a number of states have reacted
negatively to the broader 2016 JASTA amendments.
Arguably illustrating the unwillingness of states to tolerate an expansive
lifting of immunity for acts of terrorism, as a briefing paper for the European
Parliament has noted, “State or sovereign immunity is a recognised principle of
customary international law and, for that reason, JASTA has been denounced as
potentially violating international law and foreign states’ sovereignty.” 230 Officials and
legislators from a variety of states and international organizations have warned that
JASTA’s new exceptions are contrary to international law, including Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (through the Gulf
Cooperation Council),231 Morocco,232 France,233 the Netherlands,234 the United
Kingdom,235 and the European Union.236 The Briefing Paper highlights the potential
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Ibid at 9 (the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council has “expressed GCC members’ concern
with regard to JASTA, which in their view contradicts the foundations and principles of relations between
states, notably the sovereign immunity principle”).
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Ibid (“Pierre Lellouche, a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in [France’s] National Assembly
stated that JASTA would cause a ‘legal revolution in international law with major political consequences’
and declared that he would pursue legislation that would permit French citizens to sue the United States
with cause should the bill enter in force”).
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Ibid (“In July 2016, the Dutch Parliament submitted a formal letter in advance to the Judiciary Committee
hearing on the JASTA proposal. In a binding motion on the JASTA bill, members of the Parliament
considered JASTA to be ‘a gross and unwanted breach of Dutch sovereignty’ and declared that ‘the entry
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British government claiming a negligent lack of efforts to tackle Islamic radicalism in earlier decades”).
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Ibid (“At EU level, the Transatlantic Relations Working Party (COTRA) in the Council has agreed on
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for the JASTA amendments to lead to violations of international law and recommends
that the European Union react:
even though JASTA’s provisions and the current debate surrounding them
do not suggest the [JASTA] authors’ intention to target European countries,
the EU will need to react to the limitation on the principle of state immunity
proposed in JASTA…. [S]tate immunity is a well-recognised principle of
customary international law based on the sovereign equality of states in the
international legal order. Subjecting the EU Member States to civil law suits
in the US courts would therefore represent a significant violation of their
sovereignty.237

As customary international law arises as a result of state practice, this negative reaction
to the U.S. JASTA may confirm that state immunity remains a fundamental principle
of customary international law and that Jurisdictional Immunities did not pre-empt an
evolution in customary international law. Rather, the reaction could be evidence that,
with the JASTA, the United States broke too far from generally accepted custom and
many states may be unwilling to recognize new exceptions to state immunity.
As the following section will explore, when considering whether to follow
the lead of the U.S. and Canada on this issue, states may be mindful of the risks that
accompany additional exceptions to state immunity. Although adhering to the
traditional exceptions to state immunity may result in injustice to victims of state
sponsored terrorism and other violations of individual rights, states may find
compelling reasons to not accept new exceptions – including the fact that allowing
such claims may, in many instances, promise only symbolic justice.

V.

Can Civil Claims Against States Achieve Justice?

This part explores the prospect of states accepting a more restrictive understanding of
the principle of state immunity based on the nature of the claims at issue and examines
critically the ability of civil claims to achieve justice for victims of terrorism.
Advocates of additional exceptions to state immunity have advanced a variety of
arguments to support their position, including implied waivers of immunity by states
whose policies or officials violate fundamental human rights or commit serious
international crimes.238 Another approach has been to argue that state immunity must
yield to allow claims for violations of jus cogens norms (through, for example, torture,
extrajudicial killing, or genocide) because of the nature of the wrong. Another
rationale focuses on the increasing recognition of individuals as actors and subjects of
international law, who are entitled to a remedy just as individuals who suffer harm
within the forum state are already entitled to remedies under the territorial tort
exception. While these arguments may, to varying degrees, provide morally
reassurance that the US administration would seek to request a stay of proceedings as required in order to
mitigate possible breaches of the principle of state immunity”).
237
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compelling reasons to not recognize state immunity, as Jurisdictional Immunities
makes clear, there may be insufficient state practice at present to support such
exceptions. Although one may find laudable the rationale underpinning the dissenting
opinions in Jurisdictional Immunities and it may be difficult to disagree with the
conclusion that international law ought to permit claims against states when they
violate fundamental individual rights, an evolution in the law may be unlikely so long
as states consider the risks of allowing claims to outweigh the possible benefits.
States may hesitate to embrace new exceptions to state immunity for a
number of reasons, including because it could lead to an erosion of state sovereignty
that they consider unacceptable. States may also be mindful that a new exception
could be abused and could lead to friction in international relations. Finally, states
may look at the outcome in the United States (and, with Tracy (Appeal), Canada) and
be mindful that allowing civil claims against foreign states may not lead to justice or
accountability for violations. While an evolution in customary international law may
be unlikely to occur in the near future, this does not mean that it is inappropriate for
states to attempt to achieve justice for victims of terrorism and other violations of
fundamental individual rights; however, rather than allowing for civil claims against
foreign states, there may be more appropriate alternative action for states to take,
including criminal prosecutions and sanctions.

(a)

The Possible Misuse of a “Terrorism” Exception

Although the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities may have left room for a future
finding that support for terrorism is a private act for which states are not entitled to
immunity, states may hesitate to accept interpreting such acts as private. States may
be motivated to not accept support for terrorism as private because “terrorism” is
notoriously difficult to define and states may disagree on whether a group is “terrorist”.
With this potential disagreement among states and no clear agreement on what is
objectively “terrorism”, if a terrorism exception existed, there is a risk that states could
be subjected to the jurisdiction of foreign courts in cases with dubious merit. This may,
in turn, result in an erosion to state sovereignty and potential friction in international
relations that states would hesitate to accept. While negative effects on international
relations could be limited if states legislate a listing process like that in Canada (and
in the United States for section 1605(A) claims), if the exception were recognized
under customary international law, there would be no legal requirement for a listing
process. Additionally, even if a listing process were adopted by states, the exception
could still be subject to misuse or result in claims being brought where states have
divergent views on what groups are “terrorist” and what activities amount to support
for “terrorism”.
An example of such a difference of opinion may be drawn from the current
armed conflict in Syria. The Syrian government labels as “terrorist” groups fighting
against it, including some groups that are being supported by foreign states, including
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Canada and the United States.239 Similarly, Turkey considers the Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (or Y.P.G.), which is supported by the United States, to be a terrorist
group.240 Leaving aside questions such as the legality of foreign intervention in the
Syrian conflict and whether foreign states would be entitled to jurisdictional immunity
from claims because their support is occurring in the context of an armed conflict, if
Syria or Turkey were to adopt a terrorism exception to state immunity, would Canada
or the United States enjoy immunity with respect to their support of groups that Syria
or Turkey considers terrorist? With domestic courts around the world operating with
varying degrees of independence from the government of the state in question, there
may be no guarantee that foreign states brought before domestic courts for these types
of claims would be afforded due process and an impartial assessment of their
entitlement to state immunity. And, as Tracy (Appeal) makes clear, since domestic law
is likely to prevail over international law before the domestic courts, such claims may
ultimately succeed even when the legislation allowing for the claims runs counter to
the generally accepted rules of international law.

(b)

The Erosion of Sovereignty and Detrimental Effects on International
Relations

States may also hesitate to follow the lead of Canada and the United States and admit
a new exception to state immunity for terrorism due to concern for creating a slippery
slope to new exceptions and opening floodgates of claims that could negatively affect
international relations.241 The possibility of a terrorism exception leading to additional
exceptions is clear because, if states accept that they are not immune to civil claims
for their wrongs against individuals, a necessary question arises: why stop at
terrorism?242 If states do not enjoy immunity from civil claims for support of terrorism
because these acts violate fundamental human rights, a compelling argument can be
made that claims are also permissible for other international crimes, such as torture,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, which are international crimes that are legally
defined and may be less susceptible to conflicting interpretations than “terrorism”.
While it may be morally persuasive to recognize exceptions to state immunity for all
See e.g. Connor Finnegan, “A look at the factions battling in Syria’s civil war” ABC News (11 April
2017),
online:
<abcnews.go.com/International/inside-syrias-multiple-fightingfactions/story?id=46731830> (“The [Syrian] Assad regime has been quick to label anyone in the opposition
against it a "terrorist," accusing those groups' Western and Arab allies of supporting terrorism”).
239
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(25
January
2018),
online:
<www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/world/middleeast/turkey-kurds-syria.html>.
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further with their restrictions on state immunity, arguing in favour of adding a torture exception to a prior
legislative incarnation of Bill C-10, Ranganthan has noted that “Canada has a longstanding history in the
field of human rights, positioning itself as an international leader in this field. Providing victims of torture
with avenues for redress against foreign states in Canadian courts is consistent with this history”).
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of these crimes, states may hesitate to admit these exceptions due to concern that it
may erode state sovereignty.
In addition, states may not accept new exceptions due to concern that this
could have negative effects on their international relations. Canada and the Unites
States were clearly mindful of this issue when they introduced exceptions for
terrorism. With respect to Canada, a previous bill, Bill C-483, tabled by a member of
Parliament from an opposition party, would have allowed for civil claims to be brought
before Canadian courts against foreign states for genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and torture.243 However, Parliament ultimately enacted the much narrower
terrorism exception through Bill C-10. While it would be imprudent to say with
certainty why the narrower approach was adopted, it could be that the government
preferred Bill C-10’s listing process and more limited scope because it posed
substantially less risk to Canada’s international relations. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that, when Bill C-10 was before Parliament, it was favoured over another
private member’s bill also under consideration, Bill C-408.244 Like Bill C-10, Bill C408 only provided for a civil cause of action against states that sponsor terrorism;
however, Bill C-408 was significantly more expansive than Bill C-10 because it did
not include a listing requirement.245 During debates regarding Bill C-10, an opposition
member of Parliament who co-sponsored Bill C-408 (and had previously sponsored
Bill C-438) argued strongly against a listing requirement:
We have an opportunity to provide redress for Canadian victims anchored
in principles of domestic and international law. Regrettably, the
government’s bill handcuffs the victims of terrorism by subjecting them to
a political list of countries that the government chooses to target. In this the
government bill fails victims of terrorism and places politics above justice.
Simply put, the government’s bill takes as its basic premise that state
immunity should still operate, which undermines its own purpose in the
legislation even when a state is charged with supporting terrorism. Only
those states that the government chooses to single out will be held
accountable. The government’s legislation politicizes the legislation as
victims of terrorism have themselves noticed.246

The U.S. experience also suggests that the U.S. government has been mindful
that new exceptions to state immunity could have detrimental effects on international
relations. As discussed above, the executive branch strongly resisted the 2016 JASTA
amendments to the U.S. FISA and they only passed when Congress overrode a
presidential veto.247 In addition, Roht-Arriaza has noted that the listing process for
section 1605(A) claims was, in part, “designed to avoid inadvertent interference with
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Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal)).
247

See discussion at Part II(c) of this article.

296

UNBLJ

RD UN-B

[VOL/TOME 69

the conduct of foreign relations”248 and “to assure that ‘friendly’ governments are not
subject to suit notwithstanding their treatment of U.S. citizens.” 249 Roht-Arriaza also
noted that the 1996 AEDPA amendments reflect concerns expressed during the
legislative process that they could “lead to other countries… modify[ing] their own
laws relating to foreign sovereign immunity in ways that go beyond liability for torture
and the like, potentially exposing the U.S. to suit in foreign court for acts which the
U.S. might take against foreign nationals.” 250
While a more stringent and fulsome listing process in Canada and the United
States may be desirable from a victims’ rights perspective, it may be unlikely that
concerns for achieving justice will prevail over concerns regarding international
relations. It has been noted, for example, that the listing process in the United States
may pose problems to international relations when the U.S. executive attempts to
normalize relations with states that have been listed as state sponsors of terrorism:
“Although a state sponsor of terror can easily be delisted as such by the State
Department, the judgments against the… defendants are not as easy to eliminate. This
reality seriously limits the range of methods by which the executive branch can
incentivize belligerent regimes to cooperate.”251 As a result, it has be concluded that,
“although the exception was created to make it easier to fight terrorism, the exception
might actually hamper efforts to do so because the judgments create a cloud of
apprehension over normalization discussions.”252 Similarly, as Daveed GartensteinRoss has explored in the U.S. context, there is a risk that judgments could pose a
barrier to normalizing relations with foreign states, like Iran, that are listed as sponsors
of terrorism.253
Ultimately, states considering whether to follow the lead of Canada and the
United States will assess whether the erosion of state sovereignty and the resulting
friction with respect to international relations that may result from admitting new
exceptions to state immunity is desirable. The negative reaction that the JASTA
amendments to the U.S. FSIA have provoked among states may signal that states,
being mindful of this issue, may not be eager to recognize a similar exception.

(c)

The Questionable Benefits of Unenforceable Claims and the Continued
Denial of Justice

Although allowing civil claims against states that sponsor terrorism may promise
justice for victims of terrorism, the unfortunate reality is that, even if when such claims
248
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are permitted, victims are likely to face significant difficulties with holding states
financially liable. The experience of victims in the United States (and, to a more
limited extent, Canada), show that there are practical limitations that may call into
question the value of legislation like Bill C-10. Ultimately, justice may remain elusive
when successful plaintiffs are unable to enforce their judgments and cannot collect the
damages they have been awarded. This continued denial of justice calls into question
whether such legislation is ultimately beneficial.
As the Canadian and U.S. experiences show, exceptions to state immunity
within domestic legislation are likely to be narrowly crafted and applied due to
concerns about adverse effects on its international relations. With only Syria and Iran
listed under Canada’s JVTA, one may conclude that the legislation has fallen short of
the desire expressed during the legislation process that there would be “a full and
complete list” of states designated as sponsors of terrorism. 254 Without a more
complete list, the JVTA is unlikely to achieve its stated aim of “impairing the
functioning of terrorist groups in order to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against
Canada and Canadians.”255 Similarly, in the United States, the fact that there is
currently no legislated exception for the enforcement of section 1605(B) judgments
(unlike section 1605(A) judgments), reinforces the importance of a state being listed
as a sponsor of terrorism. At the time of writing, North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Syria
have been designated in the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, which
severely curtails the prospects of victims holding foreign states financially liable for
the suffering that their sponsorship of terrorism has caused. 256
Even when legislated exceptions permit the enforcement of judgments
against foreign states, victims may be unlikely to hold foreign states finically liable
for their support of terrorism or other violations of their rights. Victims may be
deterred from bringing claims because they are costly, difficult, and time consuming.
In addition, allowing for such claims may raise false hopes that satisfaction or
restitution would be forthcoming; even if a victim is successful with a claim, the
judgment that is obtained may be unenforceable if the foreign state does not have
sufficient assets within the domestic state against which the judgment may be
enforced.
The U.S. experience may provide a cautionary example for plaintiffs
considering bringing claims under Canada’s legislation. Writing shortly after the
passage of the 1996 AEDPA, Roht-Arriaza foresaw that the states listed as sponsors of
terrorism would be “those least likely to have significant assets within reach that might
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be used to satisfy a judgment.”257 States are only likely to be listed as sponsors of
terrorism when the U.S. executive is satisfied that this will not unduly interfere with
its foreign or commercial relationships with that state and, once they are listed, such
states may avoid locating significant assets within the United States in an effort to
prevent future judgments being enforced against these assets.
U.S. victims of terrorism who have successfully brought claims against
foreign states have, in many instances, been unable to collect the damages they are
awarded. As of 2008, it was estimated that there were $11.4 billion in damages
awarded against Iran alone that remained outstanding and, with Iran only having
approximately $400 million in assets in the United States, of which only $91 million
were not immune from attachment and enforcement, few plaintiffs would be able to
collect on their judgments.258 Since 2008, the gap between damages awarded against
Iran and assets against which these decisions could be enforced has only widened with
Iran being ordered to pay over $50 billion in damages as of June 2016.259 In the face
of continued injustice for victims of terrorism, the U.S. government has tried to assist
successful plaintiffs by, among other things, creating a fund providing up to $35
million to victims and their families who have received judgments against state
sponsors of terrorism.260 While there are good intentions behind this fund, the amount
clearly falls far short of providing complete compensation for plaintiffs that have been
awarded damages from Iran.
If victims are unable to enforce judgments against foreign states, legislation
allowing claims against foreign states may ultimately lead to dashed expectations for
victims. This unfortunate effect is illustrated through the experience of Stephen
Flatow, the father of Alisa Flatow, a U.S. citizen who was killed in a terrorist attack
by Hamas. The estate of Ms. Flatow obtained a judgment against Iran due to its support
of Hamas, which claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack that killed Ms. Flatow
and Mr. Flatow once spoke in favour of the AEDPA amendments to the U.S. FSIA:
[The law g]ave me a weapon…. [A] sovereign country has the right to
launch… missiles at another country to protect its rights…. I don’t have that
kind of power. I don’t have $60 million to launch those kinds of missiles.
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But now I have something that’s purely American. I have… American
jurisdiction over the people who sponsored the attack that killed Alisa. 261

However, “three years later, Mr. Flatow was devastated yet again after he ‘won’ the
case but could not force Iran to pay,” stating that, “[i]f I knew then what I know [now],
after spending tens of thousands of dollars trying to get some measure of justice for
Alisa, I don’t think I would have ever started this lawsuit.” 262 One may only surmise
that Mr. Flatow’s frustrations have, sadly, continued in light of the attempt to enforce
the Estate’s judgment against Iranian assets in Italy that was ultimately unsuccessful
in 2015.263 Reflecting on the AEDPA amendments to the U.S. FISA, in 1999, the
editorial board of The Washington Post went so far as to characterize the amendments
as a “lie”, maintaining that “Congress never should have passed, nor President Clinton
signed, a law that could only offer Mr. Flatow justice by depriving the administration
of control over important instruments of foreign policy. The law should be
repealed.”264
The experience of Dr. Wise illustrates that similar difficulties with enforcing
judgments are likely to occur in Canada, which raises the prospects that Canadian
victims of terrorism abroad may one day share Mr. Flatow’s sentiments if they are
offered only symbolic justice by prevailing in claims against foreign states, but are
ultimately unable to collect the damages awarded. Commenting on a prior incarnation
of Bill C-10, others have cautioned that,
[t]he experience of the United States… demonstrates that depriving a state
of its jurisdictional immunities is unlikely to result in plaintiffs actually
recovering damages. Thus, the legislation could lead to violations of
Canada’s international legal commitments and diplomatic confrontations
with other states, but would not provide any real benefit to victims of
terrorism or deter states who sponsor terrorism.265

As Senator Boisvenu noted during the legislative process, however, symbolic justice
could be worthwhile because “victims do not necessarily want to be compensated; they
want support from the country sheltering such a group of criminals responsible for the
death of their husband, their sister, or their father. Canada needs tools to ensure that
victims are supported.”266 While symbolic justice may provide some solace to victims,
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in light of Mr. Flatow’s statement above, one may question whether legislation like
Bill C-10 can assist with achieving justice. Indeed, although a stated goal of an antiterrorism and victims’ rights group has been “bankrupting terrorism – one lawsuit at a
time,”267 it is questionable whether civil claims can be an effective means of combating
terrorism or achieving justice for victims of terrorism when foreign states are not held
financially liable despite judgments being rendered against them. Given the possible
detrimental effects that eroding the principle of state immunity under international law
may have, states considering adopting legislation like Bill C-10 may hesitate to enact
such legislation due to fundamental doubts regarding whether its promise of elusive
justice and accountability outweighs its negative effects.

VI.

The Ongoing Quest for Ending Impunity: Criminal Accountability and
State Responsibility

Rather than raising false hopes that victims of international terrorism will obtain
justice by bringing civil claims against foreign states, an argument may be made that
states should forego legislating new exceptions to state immunity in favour of taking
concerted efforts to hold states and state officials directly responsible for their
violations of individual rights. As Chrisitan Tomuschat has asserted,
Pleas for discarding state immunity in cases of grave violations of human
rights are mostly based on fully understandable emotional reasons, but
generally fail to take into account the full scope of the regime of state
responsibility. Before inventing a new wheel, one should carefully examine
the functionality of the old wheel. The traditional mechanisms for the
settlement of damages in cases of massive injustices… are certainly not
without any flaw or defect. However, to replace this system with an
uncoordinated clutter of individual suits is the worst of all possible
solutions. A viable mechanism requires the guiding hand of an international
organization able to balance the interests at stake in a thorough manner. This
should become a project of progressive development of the law. 268

While it may be optimistic to hope that states will vest an international organization
with the competence to balance competing interests in a manner that respects state
sovereignty but achieves justice for victims of terrorism and other violations of
fundamental human rights, Tomuschat provides a strong rationale for encouraging
states to continue striving to hold other states accountable for their violations of
individual rights.
In light of the negative effects that admitting a new exception to state
immunity may have and the questionable benefits this approach offers for victims,
states should make ending impunity a goal, prioritize victims’ rights, and use and build
267
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upon existing means to hold states responsible when they violate fundamental human
rights. States could, for example, bring criminal claims against state officials (when
such officials are no longer immune from prosecution 269), assist individuals with
bringing civil claims against state officials (rather than the state itself), and use
countermeasures against states and individuals to achieve accountability.
With respect to countermeasures, it should be recalled that state immunity
acts as a procedural barrier preventing one state from being subject to another state’s
jurisdiction. It does not excuse the state’s violations of international law. As a result,
even if civil claims against the state are barred, a state that sponsors terrorism or
otherwise violates fundamental human rights has still committed an internationally
wrongful act.270 Having committed an internationally wrongful act, the state incurs
responsibility and is obliged under international law to make restitution, 271 provide
compensation,272 and give non-monetary satisfaction to victims.273 In such instances,
other states may be legally entitled to impose sanctions 274 against the state that has
violated international law in order to encourage the violating state to cease its
violations and to comply with its obligations to the victims of its violations.
Although there are difficulties with using existing means to hold states and
state officials accountable for their internationally wrongful acts and states may
hesitate to employ these means for a variety of reasons (including concern for negative
effects on their international relations), using existing mechanisms would avoid
needing customary international law to evolve for the measures to be internationally
lawful. The above approaches may also prove more palatable to states because states
retain control over claims or the countermeasures employed and can thereby determine
what action is warranted. In doing so, one would hope that states would take into
consideration the interests of victims and the international community as a whole when
determining if legal proceedings and/or countermeasures are warranted. As
Gartenstein-Ross has argued, “[b]ecause terrorism is a foreign policy problem, it is
best dealt with by the political branches of government rather than by a wide array of
courts and judges engaging in their own foreign policy experiments.” 275
For these approaches to be effective, states will need to become more strident
advocates for victims. There may be some cause for optimism that states will take
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individual rights more seriously; in recent years, some states have shown a willingness
to adopt targeted sanctions against state officials and other individuals who are
suspected of committing serious human rights abuses. One example is the U.S.
Magnitsky Act,276 which spurred similar legislation in additional states. The namesake
of the Act, Sergei Magnitsky was a lawyer who “uncovered a $230 million corruption
scheme implicating numerous Russian interior ministry officials” and was arrested
after providing testimony about this corruption. 277 After being denied adequate
medical treatment for health ailments including gallstones and pancreatitis, Mr.
Magnitsky was fatally assaulted by prison guards in 2009 and, after his death, was
tried and convicted for fraud.278 Passed in 2012 in response to Magnitsky’s death, the
Act authorized the imposition of targeted sanctions against Russian officials who were
considered responsible for Mr. Magnitsky’s death. As Canadian Senator A. Raynell
Andreychuk has asserted, “Mr. Magnitsky's case reflects the plight of countless brave
individuals working to expose the illegal activities carried out by their governments in
the pursuit of freedom, justice and democracy.” 279 In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.280 The Global Magnitsky Act
was implemented on December 2017 through an executive order of the U.S. president
that “authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General, to impose financial sanctions on persons determined
to be directly or indirectly responsible for serious human rights abuse or acts of
significant corruption” and also “authorized the Secretary of State to impose visa
restrictions on persons designated pursuant to the executive order.” 281 In 2017,
financial sanctions were imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act against 14 persons
suspected of human rights abuses and/or corruption in multiple countries, including
Burma/Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic,
Gambia, Guatemala, Liberia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.282 Demonstrating the sweeping reach of such laws, the targeted
individuals include a former head of state, military officers, an arms dealer, a surgeon,
and officials from security agencies on account of allegations of serious human rights
abuses, corruption, enrichment as a result of violations of arms bans, extrajudicial
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killings, sexual violence, assault of activists, ethnic cleansing, death of an individual
in custody, and torture. 283
A number of states have adopted similar measures, including Canada, which
passed the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law)
in 2017.284 Relying on the Act, Canada has authorized financial sanctions against 52
individuals suspected of “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”
and/or “significant acts of corruption” in Russia, South Sudan, and Venezuela. 285
Speaking in favour of Canada’s Sergei Magnitsky Law, Senator Andreychuk noted
that it was designed “to strengthen the Canadian government’s capacity in the
protection and promotion of internationally recognized human rights.” 286 Similarly,
Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister has asserted that the Act is “a valuable complement
to [Canada’s] existing human rights and anti-corruption tools” that “enable[s] Canada
to sanction, impose travel bans on and hold accountable those responsible for gross
human rights violations and significant corruption” which thereby “ensure[s] that
Canada's foreign policy tool box is effective and fit for purpose in today’s international
environment.”287 It may be that implementing tailored sanctions pursuant to legislation
like the Global Magnitsky Act and the Sergei Magnitsky Law may provide more
effective tools for states to fight impunity and achieve justice for victims than allowing
civil claims against foreign states that may result in largely symbolic outcomes.

Conclusion
While state immunity has evolved over time, it does not yet admit clearly an exception
to state immunity to allow for civil claims against states that violate fundamental
human rights abroad. Tracy (Appeal) may, therefore, be hailed as a step towards
achieving long-awaited justice for victims of state-sponsored terrorism but, in light of
the majority’s decision in Jurisdictional Immunities, it is likely that the decision has
led to Canada violating Iran’s right to jurisdictional immunity under current customary
international law.
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Even though there are compelling moral reasons to conclude that it is absurd
to permit claims against states in a commercial context but to protect them from civil
claims when they support acts of terrorism, it is likely that this absurdity persists. One
must recall, however, that this absurdity arises as a result of state practice. Even when
it impedes efforts to achieve justice for victims of terrorism (and other abuses of
human rights), international law remains premised on the consent of states. While
current customary international law may be dissatisfactory and unpalatable when it
protects states from civil claims despite the fact that they have violated fundamental
rights of individuals, as the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities (and the reaction of
states to the JASTA amendments to the U.S. FISA) suggests, the shield sovereignty
provides through state immunity likely remains in place at present. Unless and until
states recognize more consistently additional exceptions to state immunity, customary
international law will not evolve to admit such claims. By extension, unless and until
such an evolution occurs, it is likely that decisions such as Tracy (Appeal) will result
in Canada violating customary international law despite the fact that the proceedings
are not problematic from a domestic legal perspective.
While Canada and the United States could be considered “custom breakers”
that may be leading the way toward the recognition of a more restrictive approach to
state immunity, it remains to be seen whether arguments in favour of opening the door
wider to civil claims against states that violate fundamental rights of individuals will
persuade states to follow their lead. To accept a new exception, states will likely need
to determine that the benefits of a new exception outweigh the risks posed. Ultimately,
optimism about a future evolution in the law may not be warranted because states may
conclude that it is undesirable to admit a new exception that erodes state sovereignty
and may interfere with international relations in order to achieve a potentially
ineffective means of achieving justice for victims. As a result, it may be that the
majority decision in Jurisdictional Immunities was not arresting the development of
customary international law, but was, instead, consistent with the view of the majority
of states that jurisdictional immunity extends to acts of states that violate fundamental
rights of individuals.
In light of the potential for state immunity to lead to morally unjust outcomes,
it is incumbent on states to explore other means of achieving accountability, such as
bringing criminal charges against state officials; assisting individuals with bringing
civil claims against state officials; and using sanctions to deter violations of serious
human rights and encourage states to abide by their obligation to make restitution,
provide compensation, and give satisfaction to victims. Ultimately, whether and to
what extent customary international law will one day permit civil claims against states
will likely remain to be determined by how states resolve a “key question [which] is
not ‘whether sovereignty?’ but instead ‘how much sovereignty’?” 288
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